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ABSTRACT 
This thesis provides an analytical look at the performance of the TF34 engine 
installed on the Navy's S-3 and ES-3 aircraft. The objective of the thesis is to 
provide information to assist in the effective management of proposals and 
improvements being considered under the TF34 Engine Component Improvement 
Program (CIP). Historical flight data, simulator flight and thrust data, historical 
operational engine data, and data from aircrew surveys were all analyzed to 
determine the significance of TF34 engine failures in critical flight situations and 
the degree of engine performance enhancement available. Based on the research, 
it was determined that a valid thrust deficiency exists with regard to single-engine 
rate-of-climb performance of the ES-3A aircraft. Suggestions to help solve this 
deficiency are presented. The most promising recommendation for increasing 
performance with a minimal initial cost outlay is to increase the engine interturbine 
temperature (ITT) operating limit. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A.        BACKGROUND 
Since the end of the Cold War with the former Soviet Union, the United States Department 
of Defense (DOD) has undergone a significant amount of budget reduction, personnel drawdown and 
force restructuring. The "Bottoms-Up Review" approach to restructuring has looked closely at all 
DOD programs and expenditures with an eye towards reducing the cost of our national defense and 
providing the "best value" for those dollars which are invested in the future of our defense forces. 
As restructuring of our forces occurs and the global situation continues to change, the roles 
and missions of the DOD are also continuously changing. This is especially true for the United States 
Navy. With the cancellation of the Advanced Attack aircraft (AX) in the early 1990's the Navy 
encounters a situation in which no newly designed tactical aircraft will enter the fleet until well into 
the next century. With continued pressure to support an increasing number of multi-mission 
operations around the world while at the same time maintaining effective combat readiness levels in 
a shrinking budget environment, the Navy is faced with an imminent problem in regard to the support 
of its tactical aircraft fleet. 
The aging of the Navy's aircraft coupled with increased operations and fewer assets means 
that those aircraft currently in the inventory will continue to be utilized beyond their initial planned 
operational life and be utilized in missions that they were not originally designed for. An example of 
this "aging" of the fleet and additional mission requirements can be found in the Lockheed S-3 Viking 
aircraft. 
The Viking, which was originally designed as a carrier-based anti-submarine warfare (ASW) 
aircraft, entered the fleet in 1974 and made its first operational deployment in 1975. Production of 
the aircraft ended in 1978. Initial operational life (Figure 1) for the S-3 was planned at approximately 
30 years based on an estimated life of 13,000 flight hours and 3,000 catapult launches/carrier 
arrestments (cats/traps). With increased usage, enhanced mission requirements and no replacement 
aircraft on the horizon, plans are now in place to extend the life of the aircraft through a Service Life 
Extension Program (SLEP) out to 22,000 flight hours and 4,300 cats/traps [Ref. 1]. This means that 
the S-3 aircraft will have a useful service life of close to 50 years as it phases out of the Navy's 
inventory by the year 2025. 
In order to sustain this extended operational life of the aircraft, continual improvement and 
enhancements of the aircraft, its twin engines and associated components, and mission related systems 
must occur. The Naval Aircraft Engine Component Improvement Program (CIP) is one method that 
is in place and being utilized to help ensure that engine reliability, maintainability, durability and 
performance concerns are being constantly addressed over the life of the aircraft. 
B.        OBJECTIVES 
The objective of this thesis is to provide an analytical, unbiased look at the performance of 
the TF34 engine as installed on the S-3 and ES-3 aircraft, specifically with regard to single engine 
rate-of-climb (SEROC) capabilities and thrust requirements. SEROC capability refers to the ability 
of a twin-engine aircraft such as the S-3/ES-3 to safely maintain an acceptable rate-of-climb in the 
event of the failure or shutdown of one of the two operational engines. This capability becomes a 
critical flight safety issue when takeoff conditions become such that should an engine fail during 
takeoff the aircraft would not be able to achieve a positive rate-of-climb. 
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Figure 1. S-3 Type Aircraft, Requirements and Inventory [Ref. 1]. 
The thesis will attempt to provide Navy decision makers with information to assist in the 
effective management of proposals and improvements being considered under the TF34 CIP. The 
intent of this thesis is not to advocate one proposal over another but rather to carefully investigate 
the present situation, learn from historical data, and solicit operator input, in an effort to provide an 
acceptable and achievable solution to a recognized problem. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Research conducted in support of this thesis centers around several key questions. First, how 
often has a TF34 engine failed inflight? Secondly, when an engine does fail, how often does the 
failure occur in a critical phase of flight such as takeoff? In answering these first two questions, it can 
be determined how critical a parameter the SEROC is in relation to the probability that a worst case 
scenario (heavy aircraft, hot day, engine failure soon after takeoff) will occur. Third, what methods 
of improvement are currently available to provide for enhanced engine performance in conditions 
when only one of the two engines is still operational? Fourth, are there other missions or flight phases 
in which the aircraft would benefit from increased engine thrust performance? Fifth, is there a 
measure of current engine performance that can be compared with proposed improvements to help 
illustrate the degree of benefit to be derived from proposed improvements? Finally, are there projects 
currently underway in the TF34 CEP that could have an impact on improving the performance of the 
engine thus solving the stated deficiency in SEROC? 
D. ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
It is assumed for the purpose of this thesis that there is a stated thrust deficiency with regard 
to single-engine flight in the ES-3A aircraft as presently configured. This deficiency has been clearly 
stated in the form of a Mission Needs Statement (MNS) endorsed by Commander Sea Control Wing, 
U.S. Atlantic Fleet to the Chief of Naval Operations and dated 27 October 1994 [Ref. 2]. No other 
previously stated deficiencies exist with regard to performance of the TF34 engine as installed on the 
S-3B aircraft or in flight phases other than SEROC for the ES-3 A aircraft. 
For the purpose of this thesis it is assumed that the performance of the S-3B Operational 
Flight Trainer (OFT) is sufficiently realistic in its modeling of actual aircraft and engine performance 
parameters. All flight test data points used in the analysis were obtained from the S-3B OFT utilizing 
fleet pilots. The data points gathered were for an S-3B aircraft configuration and would need to be 
scaled for comparison of performance parameters to the ES-3 A aircraft. 
The thesis does not attempt to provide any type of cost/benefit analysis of the options 
discussed herein. Many ideas for engine thrust performance enhancements are in the earliest stages 
of developmental planning and sufficient cost data is not yet available for comparison. As 
development of ideas continues, a detailed cost/benefit analysis would be required prior to making 
a decision. 
This thesis is limited in its technical content. It does however serve to provide for an analysis 
of historical data, modeling of current aircraft engine thrust and SEROC performance, testing of a 
proposed enhancement to engine thrust performance, and an opportunity for operator input into the 
realm of possible solutions for the stated problem. The author is not an engineer or a test pilot and 
makes no claims as such. 
E.        ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
Chapter II provides the reader with background information and an understanding of the 
Component Improvement Program, a historical look at the S-3 aircraft and how its roles and missions 
have changed since Initial Operating Capability (IOC), evolution of the TF34 engine, and a look at 
current technology with regard to improved engine performance. 
Chapter III provides an analysis of two historical databases currently in use by the Navy. 
These databases provide an analyst with historical data with regard to engine performance, 
reliability, and safety of flight issues. Analysis of this data can help to illustrate the probability of an 
engine failure occurring during critical takeoff evolutions. By analyzing this data, future performance 
requirements and capabilities can be anticipated. 
Chapter IV explains the methodology used in the thesis research. Discussion includes 
formulation of the test plan to use S-3 OFT for collection of applicable datapoints and engine thrust 
modeling. A method of assessing current fleet engine performance through collection of data from 
operational fleet aircraft, and the use of an aircrew survey to gain an understanding of operator 
experiences are also included in this chapter. 
Chapter V details the application of the methodology discussed in the previous chapter. 
Results of the testing conducted are presented along with the author's analysis of those results. 
Chapter VI concludes the thesis with a summary of the research effort as well as a 
presentation of conclusions and recommendations resulting from the research. 
H. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
A.        COMPONENT IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM (CIP) 
It is common practice within the military services and the aircraft industry for gas turbine 
engines to be released into operation prior to having all design problems solved. The trade-off 
between Full Scale Development (FSD) of the engine and future component improvements is made 
to ensure that an engine can enter operational service within reasonable time and cost constraints. 
Deficiencies which were not identified during the research and development (R&D) phase are 
corrected through continuing investments in design improvements of the in-service engine [Ref. 3]. 
In an effort to manage this process, the Navy developed the CIP concept in the early 1950's 
with the goal of enhancing readiness and reducing life-cycle costs for its aircraft propulsion systems 
and related components. In 1980, in order to comply with DOD directive 5000.40, the Navy issued 
NAVAIR Instruction 5200.35 [Ref. 4], titled "Policy, Guidelines and Responsibilities for the 
Administration of the Aircraft Engine Component Improvement Program", which defines the 
objectives, functions, and limitations of the CIP. 
1. Objectives of the Component Improvement Program 
The stated objectives of the Navy CIP are to [Ref. 4]: 
Maintain an engine design which allows the maximum aircraft availability at the lowest 
total cost to the government (primarily production and support cost). 
Correct, as rapidly as possible, any design inadequacy, which adversely affects the safety- 
of-flight. 
Correct any design inadequacy, which causes unsatisfactory engine operation or adversely 
affects maintainability and logistic support service. 
CIP is designed to be both reactive and proactive throughout an engine's life cycle to resolve 
newly identified problems, and to find ways to reduce costs of aircraft and engine ownership. This 
can be done by improving aircraft readiness, and operational reliability and maintainability. Aircraft 
engines represent a large budgetary expense for both the military and commercial aircraft industries, 
therefore there is a continuous need for post-development engineering processes to keep engines 
performing effectively and safely. 
2. Functions of the Component Improvement Program 
The CIP performs the following functions [Ref. 4]: 
• Problem Solving. Investigation and resolution of flight safety problems. Correction of 
service revealed safety-of-flight problems is the highest priority of the CIP. 
• Problem Avoidance. Aggressive mission testing, analytical sampling and engineering 
analyses designed to forecast low cycle fatigue rates, life limits and detection of other 
deficiencies prior to their occurring in fleet aircraft. 
• Product Improvement. Improve engine maintainability, durability and reliability and 
provide tangible evidence of a reduced cost of operation and support of engine ownership. 
• Product Maturation. Provide engineering support to retain the engine's ability to perform 
over the lifetime of the engine in the inventory. To use this opportunity to insert improved 
technology into the engine, its support equipment, accessories and replacement parts. 
The Navy's CIP provides engineering support from the time the first engine of a type and 
model is introduced into the fleet until the last engine ofthat type leaves the active inventory. The 
CIP supports the follow-on engineering to identify and resolve all problems encountered by a model 
during active service, not just those related to the original design specification. The CIP allows for 
the redesign of engine parts through continued engineering efforts and testing.  It also provides 
improved engine serviceability for parts, maintenance techniques, and increases in engine maintenance 
service intervals. 
3. Limitations of the Component Improvement Program 
The CIP is not intended to [Ref. 4]: 
• Increase or expand the basic engine performance characteristics beyond those defined in 
the engine model specification. 
• Provide production or modification hardware kits or maintenance labor beyond that 
necessary for CIP service evaluation testing. 
• Provide engineering support to the engine production process. 
• Provide for the preparation, publication or distribution of power plant changes. 
• Provide data required for the manufacture of engines or changes thereto. 
• Provide maintenance engineering or support. 
Although the intent of the CIP is not to increase the engine's basic performance characteristics 
beyond that contained in the specification for the engine model, advances in materials and engine 
design technologies may serve to increase engine performance characteristics when improvements 
are made. 
B.        HISTORY OF THE S-3 AIRCRAFT 
On 4 August 1969 Lockheed announced the receipt of a $461 million contract from the Navy 
to develop a new carrier-based anti-submarine warfare aircraft designated the S-3 A Viking. 
Development was carried out by Lockheed in partnership with Vought Systems Division of LTV and 
Univac Federal Systems Division of Sperry Rand. Vought designed and built the wing, engine pods, 
tail unit and landing gear, while Univac developed the digital computer which is the heart of the 
Viking weapon system. Two high bypass ratio turbofan engines were provided by General Electric 
(GE) and Lockheed built the fuselage, integrated the electronics and completed final assembly at their 
Burbank, CA facility. 
The first S-3A prototype rolled out on schedule on 8 November 1971 with the first flight 
made on 21 January 1972. In May 1972 the Navy announced an order for the first production lot of 
13 aircraft with another order for 35 in April 1973 and 45 in October 1973. A total of 187 aircraft 
were eventually procured with the Navy taking delivery of the final one in June 1978. 
In August 1981 the Navy awarded Lockheed a full scale engineering development contract 
for the S-3A Weapons System Improvement Program (WSIP). Aircraft modified under the WSJJP 
were redesignated S-3B. Improvements included increased acoustic processing capacity, expanded 
electronic support measure capability, better radar processing, a new sonobuoy telemetry receiver 
system and provisions for the Harpoon missile. The first S-3B conversions were completed and 
delivered to the Atlantic Fleet in 1987 and conversion is now complete for both the Atlantic and 
Pacific Fleets. In addition to the S-3B conversion, all S-3 A aircraft were also reconfigured as tanker 
aircraft being given the ability to transfer fuel from internal tanks to a "buddy store" mounted on the 
wing pylon. This addition of the tanker capability has had a significant impact on the S-3's mission. 
C.        HISTORY OF THE ES-3 AIRCRAFT 
In March 1988 Lockheed was awarded a $66 million Navy contract for prototype 
development of an electronic reconnaissance variant of the S-3A designated ES-3 A. The ES-3 A was 
designed to fulfill the role of Battle Group Passive Horizon Extension System for long-range signals 
monitoring of potentially hostile forces upon the retiring of the EA-3B Skywarrior airframe. Sixteen 
ES-3 A aircraft have been delivered to the Navy. 
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Conversion of the S-3A to ES-3A involves employing the weapons bay for equipment and 
replacing the dual controls of the right front seat with tactical displays for the electronic warfare 
officer. The two rear seat stations are also completely modified and equipped with new displays. 
Global Positioning System (GPS)/Navstar and Omega navigation systems are added and three 
AN/AYK-14 processors replace the single AN/AYK-10. Equipment included in the modification 
adds approximately 3,000 lbs to the basic aircraft weight while 60 additional external antennae and 
pods significantly increase the airframe drag configuration. No changes to the aircraft powerplant 
system were included in the conversion. 
D.        GENERAL ELECTRIC TF34 ENGINE 
1. History of Engine 
It was announced in April 1968 that Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) had awarded 
General Electric (GE) a contract for development of the TF34. The high bypass ratio turbofan had 
won a 1965 Navy competition aimed a providing a tailor made engine in the 9,000 lb static thrust (st) 
category for the VS(X) application by 1972 within a budget of $96 million. In August 1972 the 
TF34-GE-2, the initial variant, completed its Model Qualification Test (MQT) and subsequently 
entered production. The S-3A entered fleet service in February 1974, and in January 1975 GE began 
shipment of the TF34-GE-400A (9,275 lb st), which replaced the GE-2 as the S-3 A engine. The GE- 
400A model incorporated various improvements, with changed external piping, an adaptive control 
system for optimizing accessory power extraction, and a simplified rocket gas ingestion system. 
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2. TF34 Engine Variants 
Since the selection of the TF34 engine to power the Navy S-3, GE has continued development 
of the basic engine configuration and has sold variants of the engine to the Air Force, Army, NASA 
and commercial airline industry applications. 
In 1970 the TF34 was selected to power the twin-engine Fairchild Republic A-10A 
Thunderbolt II attack aircraft to compete in the AX competition. The A-10A application led in July 
1972 to an Air Force contract for development of the TF34-GE-100 (9,065 lb st) with side mounting 
capability and longer fan ducting. The GE-100 flew in the first A-10A in May 1972. When the A- 
10A won the AX competition, the TF34-GE-100 was re-engineered to minimize unit cost and 
formally qualified for production in October 1974. 
In 1974 a third version of the TF34, most nearly resembling the original GE-2 engine, was 
selected to provide auxiliary thrust for the Sikorsky S-72 RSRA (rotor systems research aircraft) for 
NASA and the Army. 
In April 1976 GE's General Aviation Engine Department announced the CF34 as a new 
turbofan in the 7,000-9,000 lb static thrust class for business and commercial aircraft. A natural 
derivative of the military TF34, the CF34 is closely similar to the GE-100 but with external 
configuration tailored to FAA and customer requirements. In January 1980 the CF34 was selected 
by Canadair to power the Challenger 601, which was certificated in March 1983. The CF34 features 
an Automatic Power Reserve (APR) capability and variants include the CF34-1A (8,650 lb st), CF34- 
3A, -3Al, -3B (9,220 lb st with APR/ 8,729 lb st without APR). 
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E.        INCREASING AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE CAPABILITIES 
Several methods are currently available for increasing the performance of an aircraft. The 
engines may be modified in an effort to produce more thrust for a given aircraft, a different engine 
which is capable of producing more thrust than the original engine may be installed on the aircraft, 
aircraft gross weight may be decreased to allow for greater performance from the currently installed 
engines, or aircraft drag may be reduced by redesign or "cleaning up" of the airframe design. This 
thesis will consider only those changes involving improvements, modifications or changes to the 
engines installed on the S-3/ES-3 and will not further discuss changes or improvements with regard 
to the airframe itself or systems carried within the aircraft. 
1. New Technologies for Engine Performance Improvement 
Aircraft engine technologies are constantly changing in an effort to develop quieter, more fuel 
efficient, and more powerful engines. As a result, new technologies can at times be applied to 
existing engines to increase their performance at a fraction of the cost of developing a new engine. 
Allison Gas Turbines has increased the thrust of their T406/GMA3007/GMA2100 family of 
turbofan engines by approximately 40% [Ref. 5]. The additional power generated widens the 
commercial and military applications of the engine and provides the military T406 turboshaft version 
with significant growth capabilities for the future. The increased thrust is achieved by boosting high 
temperature turbine temperatures by about 200° F. Allison engineers have added an increased 
temperature high pressure turbine, a cast titanium outer combustor diffuser case, and a ceramic 
matrix tailcone reinforced with silicon carbide fibers to achieve the higher temperatures. 
Allison is also at work on a project which will increase turbine inlet temperatures by about 
400° F compared with the AE 3007. Allison's ability to achieve the 400° F increase rests on two 
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technologies. The first is a film-cooled first-stage turbine blade made from second-generation single 
crystal materials. The second is a first-stage vane that incorporates hybrid Cast Cooled technology. 
Cast Cooled is Allison's trademark name for a proprietary process in which cast components can be 
made to incorporate the company's highly effective Lamilloy or laminated alloy transpiration cooling 
scheme during the casting process. 
Pratt & Whitney is relying on increased temperatures, improved materials and higher 
component efficiencies to develop an upgraded, 90,000 lb thrust PW4000 [Ref. 6]. The growth of 
the basic 84,000 lb thrust engine is a low-risk, evolutionary effort because many of the qualification 
and certification tests necessary for the engine have already been run at or above 90,000 lb thrust. 
To achieve the increased thrust in the PW4000, Pratt engineers will moderately raise turbine 
temperatures. Increased temperature capable turbine materials and coatings already developed for 
some military engines will be added to maintain turbine component durability and life. 
2. Automatic Power Reserve (APR) System 
General Electric has proposed an improvement for the TF34 engine which would serve to 
increase engine thrust to meet the thrust deficiency in SEROC capability [Ref. 7]. The APR system 
would implement a "T5 Control Amplifier Disable" scheme which would remove control amplifier 
signals from the fuel metering valve in the fuel control when a loss of engine signal is received, thus 
enabling increased engine performance. A similar APR system is already in use on GE's commercial 
engine variant (the CF34). The APR system on the CF34 provides an increase in available thrust of 
over 5% (8,729 lb st to 9,220 lb st) and GE states that as much as a 20% increase is achievable on 
the military's TF34 engine. 
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3. Installation of New Engines 
Although it would involve substantially greater initial cost than the previously mentioned 
performance enhancement ideas, the installation of new engines could provide significant savings in 
maintenance and operating costs over the life of the engine as well as providing an immediate solution 
to the thrust deficiency problem. As an example, the latest variant of the TF34, GE's CF34-8C, is 
in the 13,000 lb st class and provides approximately 50% more thrust and a thrust-to-weight ratio 
15% higher than the CF34-3A1 engine currently in service worldwide on the Canadair Regional Jet. 
The CF34-8C features a larger fan, higher flow compressor, new low pressure turbine, and a dual- 
channel Full Authority Digital Electronic Control (FADEC). In 1994, the CF34 accumulated over 
191,000 flight hours with zero inflight shutdowns and an engine related aircraft dispatch reliability 
of 99.98% was obtained. The replacement of TF34 engines with new CF34 or similar engines could 
quickly solve any thrust deficiencies of the S-3/ES-3 aircraft. 
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HL ANALYSIS OF DATABASES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will provide a description of two databases currently in use by the Navy for the 
collection and analysis or historical aircraft maintenance and safety related data. Procedures for 
conducting a search of each database will be discussed as well as analysis of the data that was 
collected. The intent of the research into this historical data is to attempt to determine how often the 
TF34 engine has failed inflight. Specific attention will be directed to engine failures which may have 
occurred during the takeoff phase of flight when SEROC capabilities are of the greatest concern to 
the aircrew. 
B. NALDA DATABASE 
1. Description of NALDA System 
The Naval Aviation Logistics Data Analysis (NALDA) System evolved from a need for 
improved data analysis capabilities to support growth in sophistication and complexity of naval air 
weapons and associated support systems. Its primary objective is to utilize state-of-the-art 
management information systems technology to provide centralized logistics data analysis capabilities 
[Ref. 8]. 
Currently, NALDA is an operational Automated Information System (AIS). Computer 
services are provided by the Defense Megacenter (DMC) Mechanicsburg, PA via a service level 
agreement. The system has been developed utilizing the Data Base Management System 2000 
following a comprehensive evaluation study. The telecommunications network presently consists 
principally of local dial-up and WATS lines.   Data input is provided from the Naval Aviation 
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Maintenance and Material Management Data System (Aviation 3M) via the Naval Sea Logistics 
Center (NSLC), Aviation Supply Office (ASO) and the Naval Air Technical Services Facility 
(NATSF). There are several databases within the NALDA system which are used for engine 
management. They are the Aircraft Engine Management System (AEMS), the Engine Composition 
Tracking (ECOMTRAK) and the Parts Life Tracking System (PLTS). 
The NALDA system provides a centralized data bank, including maintenance retrieval and 
analysis capabilities that can be used in an interactive or batch manner through remote terminals in 
support of the Naval Aviation Integrated Logistics Support community. Both the content of the data 
bank and the retrieval and analysis capabilities are designed to assist users in making improved 
decisions affecting fleet aircraft readiness. The primary source of data is the monthly Aviation 3M 
data received at DMC via NSLC. Secondary sources of data are the Naval Aviation Depots 
(NADEP) and ASO. 
NALDAs capabilities furnish a wide spectrum of uses for managers, engineers, analysts and 
logisticians utilizing the system. All uses are related to answering questions that arise when personnel 
deal with day-to-day logistics problems. The ability to access data files interactively produces specific 
facts on demand. Another aspect is the on-line availability of special programs such as equipment 
condition analysis, deterministic models, and regression analysis, to predict the effects of actions or 
to determine cause and effect relationships. 
2. NALDA Data Search Procedures Used for this Thesis 
Since this author did not have the ability to query the NALDA database directly from the 
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), he had to rely on others with NALDA access capability to 
conduct the requested search.  During the course of conducting his research the author obtained 
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NALDA data from three sources; engineers at the NADEP Alameda, engineers at Powerplants and 
Propulsion Division at the Naval Air Warfare Center - Aircraft Division (NAWCAD) Patuxent River, 
and from analysts at Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR). 
To obtain desired information you must be able to clearly specify exactly what information 
you are looking for and then have an experienced NALDA operator write the query and extract the 
data. However, the database is not very user friendly and detailed queries to extract data do not 
always yield the results you would expect. The more specific you can be concerning the data you are 
looking for, the better your data quality will be. Transmission of data from these sites was mainly by 
e-mail which in itself caused some problems in coding and decoding of the attached data. If time 
permits, it is probably easiest to have the information downloaded to a disk and mailed to you. If you 
are able to travel to a site with NALDA access ability and have an analyst available to work directly 
with then you will be assured of obtaining the data you need in a timely manner. NPS is attempting 
to obtain the capability to access NALDA directly which would be a tremendous asset for future 
research. 
3. Results of Data Search 
The NALDA data search conducted asked for all instances of inflight aborts involving TF34 
engine-related malfunctions. An inflight abort is defined as the termination of a flight due to a 
malfunction occurring while airborne which requires a maintenance action to correct. The inflight 
abort reporting code does not necessarily mean that all incidents involve the failure or shutdown of 
an engine, but rather that something failed or malfunctioned to a degree that the aircraft was 
considered to be in a down status awaiting maintenance. 
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The data query returned 682 events over an almost 20-year period from January 1976 to 
February 1995 and is included in spreadsheet form as Appendix A. These events were broken down 
by month into the following categories: DATE (year/month, yymm), FAILURE (NALDA 
malfunction code), NOMENCLATURE (name of malfunction code failure), EVENTS (number of 
engines that the particular malfunction occurred on during the month), and FLT. HRS. (total number 
of TF34 engine flight hours for the month). In analyzing the data, each listing was multiplied by the 
number of events to arrive at a total of 1382 engine-related inflight abort incidents during the 1976 
to 1995 timeframe. Individual incidents were then sorted for those that would have most likely 
involved a failure or shutdown of the engine inflight. Those malfunction categories chosen for further 
analysis were flameout, compressor stall, low power/thrust, excessive vibration, and burned or 
overheated. It is noted that there could certainly have been other malfunctions that may have required 
the engine to have been shutdown inflight, but there was not sufficient individual incident narrative 
information contained in the data to enable that determination to be made. 
4. Analysis of Results 
Analysis of the sorted NALDA data showed that during the given time period 50 events 
occurred in which an engine failed or was required to be shutdown inflight. These 50 events 
breakdown in the following manner: Flameouts - 19, Compressor stalls - 5, Low power/thrust - 4, 
Excessive vibration - 16, Burned or overheated - 6. 
Based on a total flight time for the period of approximately 1.065 million hours (flight time 
data is approximate due to the fact that those months which did not have a reportable incident were 
not listed for flight time purposes, an average value was calculated from all months with reported 
flight time, and that value of 4,671 hours/month was used in the calculations), this equates to one 
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engine failure/shutdown per 21,300 flight hours or an average of under three events per year. From 
the data obtained there was no way to determine what phase of flight the engine failure/shutdown may 
have occurred.  In any case, the rate of TF34 inflight engine failure/shutdown based on historical 
NALDA data is quite small. 
C.        NAVAL SAFETY CENTER DATABASE 
1. Description of Database 
The Naval Aviation Safety Program (NASP) is set forth in OPNAVTNST 3750.6 and states 
the purpose of preservation of human and material resources. The NASP encompasses all activities 
which may detect, contain or eliminate hazards in naval aviation. The program is based on the 
doctrine of necessitarianism (events are inevitably determined by preceding causes), and on a 
corollary ofthat doctrine (events may be prevented by elimination of their causes) [Ref. 9]. 
According to the NASP, a hazard is defined as a potential cause of damage or injury and the 
program is designed to identify and eliminate hazards before they result in mishaps. Mishaps are 
broken down into three categories, Flight Mishaps (FM), Flight Related Mishaps (FRM), and Aircraft 
Ground Mishaps (AGM). These categories are further divided into three severity classes; A, B, and 
C. Class A mishaps involve damage in excess of $1,000,000, loss of an aircraft or any fatality or 
permanent total disability. Class B mishaps involve damage greater than $200,000 but less than $1M, 
a permanent partial disability, and/or hospitalization of five or more personnel. Class C mishaps 
involve damage greater than $10,000 but less than $200K, and/or injuries that result in one or more 
lost workdays. Any occurrence in which the total cost of property damage is less than $10K and 
there are no defined injuries in not considered a reportable naval aircraft mishap. 
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The Naval Safety Center in Norfolk, VA maintains the Safety Information Management 
System (SMS), a database which dates back to 1980 and contains all hazards and mishaps reported 
as required by OPNAVTNST 3750.6. 
2. SIMS Data Search Procedures Used for this Thesis 
The SIMS database, much like the NALDA database, is not very user friendly if you have not 
received training on its operation. Unlike the NALDA database, however, it is currently accessible 
from NPS. The Aviation Safety Officer School located on the fourth floor of the West Wing in 
Hermann Hall has modem access to the SIMS database. 
It should be noted though that the data transfer rate is extremely slow and, as with NALDA 
if you don't know exactly how to state your query you're not going to get the data you need. An 
alternate method for obtaining SIMS data was via direct contact with the analysts at the Naval Safety 
Center. A request for query is included as Appendix B and can be sent via fax or mail to an analyst 
who will ensure you obtain the data you are searching for. Results of your query can be obtained via 
fax, mail, or electronic data transmission. 
3. Results and Analysis 
The request for query submitted for this research effort asked for all S-3 type aircraft engine- 
related events from 1980 to present. The query returned 79 separate engine-related events dating 
from 1/27/80 to 9/19/94. Of the events, the breakdown by aircraft type and model was as follows; 
S-3A = 64, S-3B = 11, ES-3A = 2, US-3A = 2. 
Classification of the events reported in the database included 35 flight mishaps, 10 aircraft 
ground mishaps, and 34 events that were not reportable as mishaps under OPNAV 3750.6. Of the 
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45 reportable mishaps, four were Class A damage, six were Class B damage, and 35 involved Class 
C damage. 
A total of 49 of the 79 events (62%) were attributed to Foreign Object Damage (FOD) of one 
form or another. NAVAIR Instruction 3 750.6 A Prevention of Foreign Object Damage to Gas 
Turbine Engines, states: 
Damage to gas turbine engines from ingestion of foreign 
objects continues to plague Naval Aviation. FOD is hazardous to 
personnel safety, seriously degrades mission capability, and is cost 
prohibitive. The cost and time involved in the repair of engines 
damaged by foreign objects depletes limited repair funds and capacity, 
and impacts commensurately on other programs. Since most FOD is 
preventable, a continuing and dedicated FOD prevention program is 
mandatory. 
Since engine FOD is considered preventable and efforts are underway to reduce the problem, 
those 49 FOD events reported in the data will not be considered for further analysis. 
Fourteen of the remaining 30 events (17.7% of total reported events) involved the engine 
failing or needing to be shutdown inflight (two of the shutdowns were attributed to FOD). Four of 
the 14 (5% of total events) events occurred in the critical flight phase during or shortly after takeoff 
(Figure 2). Each of these four events involved an engine fire. There were no incidents of dual-engine 
failures reported. 
The total number of TF34 engine flight hours for the last 15 years is approximately 844,000 
flight hours according to NALDA records. The rate of reported events involving engine failure 
during or immediately after takeoff equates to one event every 211,000 flight hours or a rate of 0.47 
per 100,000 flight hours. This rate is well below the Naval Aviation Safety Program standard of less 
23 
Naval Safety Center Database 
S-3 ENGINE RELATED EVENTS 1980 - PRESENT 
49 (62.0%) FOD 
4 (5.1%) Takeoff Failures 
10 (12.7%) Inflight Failure/Shutdown 
16 (20.3%) Other malfunctions/ground mishaps 
Total Events Reported = 79 
14 of 79 events (17.7%) involved engine failure/shutdown inflight 
Figure 2. Naval Safety Center Database, S-3 Engine Related Events. 
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than 2.00 Class A mishaps per 100,000 flight hours. It should be noted that of the four takeoff 
related events that were reported, two involved only Class C damage while the other two did not 
meet mishap reporting thresholds for damages. It would appear from the data collected that the 
probability of a mishap involving engine failure during the takeoff evolution is extremely small. This 
could lead to the conclusion that while the lack of a positive SEROC is a documented problem for 
the ES-3A aircraft, it is not likely to be a mishap causal factor based on historical data. 
The quality of the data obtained from the Safety Center database must be carefully considered 
with regard to reporting requirements. Often, only those events in which a reportable mishap 
actually occurs and is required to be reported is any type of report generated. Submission criteria 
for Hazard Reports states only that a Hazard Report "should" be submitted whenever a hazard is 
detected, it is not a formal reporting requirement. Events may occur in which minimum mishap 
reporting thresholds are not met and the squadron does not bother to send in a hazard report detailing 
the problem. The fact that an engine fails inflight, in and of itself, does not require that a report be 
sent to the Safety Center. Likewise, each time that an aircraft launches in conditions that does not 
enable it to achieve a positive SEROC, a defined hazard exists, but is not necessarily reported. So, 
while the rate of mishaps in which a SEROC deficiency may have been a factor appears to be 
extremely low, the number of non-reported events could conceivably be much higher. 
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IV. METHODOLOGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will discuss the methodology used to collect data for analysis in the research 
effort. Three separate methods of data collection have been utilized; flight simulation data points, 
a collection of actual operational engine data from the fleet, and an aircrew survey. 
B. FLIGHT SIMULATION AS A RESEARCH TOOL 
The design and development of modern aircraft makes extensive use of flight simulation. A 
vast range of problems is open to investigation utilizing simulators. The essential feature of all such 
investigations is to introduce the pilot into a closed loop control situation, so that account is taken 
of his capabilities and limitations. The expectation is that within the bounds of the experimental 
conditions, the behavior in the simulator matches the behavior in actual flight situations. Although 
it is impossible to reproduce on the ground all the characteristics of an aircraft as seen by a pilot in 
the air, the assumption behind the use of the simulator for research purposes is that the pilot controls 
the simulator in the same way he would the aircraft. Flight simulation is a vital part of aeronautical 
research and its use has increased considerably in recent years as equipment has improved and more 
realistic models have been developed [Ref. 10]. 
1. Engine Modeling 
In simulating performance of those parts of an aircraft which have mechanical components, 
such as the engine, simulator designers can utilize high or low sophistication design approaches. The 
requirement to effectively simulate the engine throughout its operating environment so that it will 
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functionally interface with all related systems can be approached by two basic methods and most 
simulations use a mixture of both methods. 
The first method is the total output simulation. In this approach the various required outputs 
are defined in complex mathematical functions of certain input conditions and are used in an open 
loop. This method requires a considerable volume of data plus mathematical expertise of a high 
order. It is difficult to incorporate failure cases for training, it is inflexible, and it is expensive in 
computation time. Consequently, total output simulation is normally restricted to 
engineering/research applications where training and real time simulation is not a requirement. 
The second method is called the component simulation method. In this method, each major 
component of the engine, such as the combustor, compressor, turbines, etc ..., is modeled along with 
the associated component systems such as the oil system and starter system. All the component 
simulations are then coupled together and use the simulated fuel control unit to close the computation 
loop in order to provide a close analog of the real engine. Data is derived and supplied by the engine 
manufacturer from engine and component tests and is correlated with results from engineering 
simulations. As with the total output method, component simulation also requires considerable 
mathematical and thermodynamic expertise. 
Most simulators use a combination of the two methods previously mentioned and make use 
of the manufacturer's normalized steady-state performance data. The perceived performance, as seen 
on cockpit mounted instruments and in flight characteristics, can be sufficiently close to a real nominal 
engine that any differences observed can be attributed to minor engine-to-engine related differences 
in real life [Ref. 10]. 
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2. Use of the S-3B Simulator 
The S-3B Operational Flight Trainer (OFT) is designated as training device 2F92B. The 
primary purpose of the trainer is to provide pilot and crew training in the procedures required to fly 
the S-3B aircraft in fulfillment of its intended missions. The trainer provides facilities for realistically 
reproducing the complex interrelationships of flight controls, sensor systems, navigation, 
communication, and automatic pilot operations. Through the use of the OFT, knowledge can be 
gained in the flying characteristics of the S-3B aircraft as well as the interaction of its many systems 
[Ref. 11]. 
The trainer provides numerous advantages over the use of operational equipment for S-3B 
crew training. The training problem in real-world terms relies upon the experience of the aircrew for 
a solution. In actual flight training some emergency operating procedures entail prohibitive risks and 
so are not conducted in flight. The trainer can overcome these inflight limitations and provide the 
aircrew with the experience necessary to effectively solve real-world problems. 
All trainer operational parameters are simulated to a degree sufficient to create the illusion 
or real-world operations. The OFT flight characteristics are effectively simulated in each axis of 
pitch, roll, and yaw as are the aircraft inflight performance characteristics of velocity, altitude, angle- 
of-attack, sideslip, power setting, and aircraft configuration. Cockpit instruments and controls react 
to aerodynamic and operator inputs as specified or in conformance with actual aircraft characteristics. 
The OFT propulsion model design tolerance limits are listed (Table 1) and a graph illustrating 
simulator output as compared to actual aircraft flight test data is shown (Figure 3). The graph, which 
plots NG (engine gas generator speed) on the Y-axis and PLA (power lever angle, throttle position), 
shows OFT thrust both before and after corrections made as a result of instrumented test flights. 
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TRAINER PARAMETER TOLERANCE LIMIT 
POWERPLANT TOLERANCES: 
Power lever position 
Fuel flow 
Fuel flow rate of change 
Fuel depletion rate 
Engine rpm (%) 
Engine accel & decel time 
Engine windmilling speed 
Exhaust gas temperature 
Bleed air temperature 
Bleed air pressure 
Exhaust gas temperature 
rate of change 
Oil pressure 
Oil pressure rate of change 
Fan speed 
Fan speed rate of change 
Thrust 
Engine light-off time 
5.00% 
5.00% (or 1% of maximum value) 
25.00% 
5.00% (or 1% of maximum value) 
2.00% 
15.00% 
5.00% 
Range:   0° -  409°C±25°C 
410°-   899°C±10°C 
900° - 1000° C ± 25° C 
25° C 
10.00% (or 5 lb, whichever is greater) 
25.00% 
10.00% 
25.00% 
2.00% (below cruise) 
1.00% (cruise and above) 
25.00% 
3.00% (or 0.3% of maximum value) 
10.00% 
Table 1. S-3B OFT Simulator Capabilities [Ref. 11]. 
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Figure 3. S-3B OFT Propulsion Model Improvements 
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3. Simulator Datapoint Collection 
The purpose of utilizing the S-3B OFT was to gather data with regard to SEROC and engine 
thrust produced both with and without the engine T5 system disabled and to compare the rate-of- 
climb obtained with those performance numbers published in the S-3B NATOPS manual. The use 
of the T5 system disable switch would simulate the function of the proposed APR system on the 
aircraft by allowing the operating engine to run at higher temperatures. The benefit obtained from 
disabling the T5 system could then be measured both in terms of increased thrust, and increased 
SEROC. 
Data was collected for a sea-level takeoff of an aircraft weighing 44,000 lbs at temperatures 
of 60°, 80°, and 100° F. The 44,000 lb aircraft weight was chosen to ensure a positive rate-of-climb 
would be maintained in all configuration and temperature ranges and because it would closely 
approximate the weight of a "heavy" aircraft following jettison of external stores in an emergency 
SEROC situation. 
The simulator's thrust model was then used to generate thrust data at various temperature 
ranges and with varying headwind components to simulate the ram air effect of wind and airspeed on 
the thrust production of the engine. This data was collected at sea-level and at a 4,000' field elevation 
and thrust measurements were collected for the engine both with and without the T5 control system 
operating in an effort to determine the amount of benefit derived from disabling the T5 system. 
C.        EFFECTS OF FAN SPEED DROOP ON THRUST 
In a turbofan engine such as the TF34, fan speed (NF) is a good indicator of engine health and 
the amount of thrust being produced by the engine. Fan speed "droop" is a temporary reduction in 
fan speed occurring shortly after the throttle is rapidly advanced to the maximum setting from a lower 
32 
power setting. The reason for this droop in fan speed is due to the varying radial dimensions in 
engine rotor and stator hardware caused by thermal and centrifugal loads. The magnitude of the 
droop is dependent on engine conditions just prior to the rapid throttle advance. There are several 
variables which affect fan speed while the aircraft is on deck and inflight, these include ambient 
temperature, bleed air extraction, atmospheric pressure and ram air effects. 
Testing to measure the amount of fan speed droop was conducted by GE on the TF34-100 
(Air Force variant) in 1979 [Ref. 13]. This testing concluded that the TF34-100 fan speed droop 
transient reached an average value of-1.5% (± 0.5%) from the final stabilization value approximately 
eight seconds after the throttle was advanced from 90% NG to maximum. The average value was 
maintained for approximately 16 seconds before stabilizing. This testing recommended that the 
average droop value be incorporated into pilot ground roll max power checks conducted on the Air 
Force A-10 aircraft. 
With the recent installation of EPAMS (Engine Performance and Monitoring System) on 
several S-3B and ES-3A aircraft the issue of fan speed droop has again come to light. EPAMS data 
has shown that the TF3 4-400 engine reaches peak fan speed at approximately 10 seconds after the 
throttles have been advanced from idle to maximum. This peak is the value that is currently being 
used by Navy aircrew as a GO/NO GO criteria on engine health just prior to launch. Following this 
peak value the NF begins to steadily decrease reaching a minimum at approximately 30 seconds after 
throttle advance. During carrier operations, this 30-second time period closely corresponds with the 
amount of time spent at full power just prior to catapult launch. So conceivably, aircraft are being 
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launched at the same time that the engines are producing the minimum amount of thrust available 
with full power applied. 
The thrust model of the S-3B OFT was again utilized to determine the effects of fan speed 
droop on thrust produced. Data was collected at varying temperature and wind component ranges 
and with a simulated fan speed droop of-100 to -400 rpm. 
In addition to the simulator data illustrating the effects of fan speed droop on thrust, data was 
collected from operational aircraft to determine the extent of the droop problem on engines currently 
in the fleet. A TF34 fan speed check data collection card (Figure 4) was distributed to several 
squadrons in an effort to measure actual fan speeds against NATOPS fan speed check limits and to 
measure the amount of fan speed droop presently occurring in the Navy's fleet of TF34 engines. 
TF34 FAN SPEED CHECK 
SQUADRON: 
OAT: 
BUNO: 
ALT: 
WINDS: A/C Heading: 
Idle Fan Speed: ENG. #1 
Actual Peak Fan Speed at MRT: 
ENG. #1 
DATE: 
R. Humidity  
Calc. Fan Speed 
ENG. #2 
ENG. #2 
Actual Stabilized Fan Speed at MRT (wait approx. 30 seconds after peak reading) 
ENG. #1 ENG. #2  
Figure 4. TF34 Fan Speed Check Data Card. 
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D.        AIRCREW SURVEY 
An aircrew survey was distributed to the fleet in an effort to gather more historical data and 
provide for operator input to the research effort and is included as Appendix C. The survey consisted 
of three sections; background information, single-engine flight information, and performance of the 
TF34 engine. 
1. Survey Background Information 
Background information requested was straight forward and easy to complete, it asked the 
following questions: Pilot or Naval Flight Officer (NFO), VS or VQ Community, Total flight time, 
S-3 flight time, and ES-3 flight time. 
2. Single-Engine Flight Information 
This section was designed to obtain historical information from aircrews concerning their 
experiences in the single-engine flight regime. The intent was to identify the number of times that 
aircrews have actually experienced critical single-engine flight situations. This section consisted of 
six multiple choice questions. 
The first question asked if an aircrew had ever experienced takeoff conditions in which they 
did not have a positive SEROC as calculated from the NATOPS performance charts assuming the 
landing gear retracted. Having the landing gear retracted is the best case scenario, and generally you 
would not want to attempt takeoff in a condition in which you did not have a positive SEROC 
especially if you assumed that the landing gear could be retracted. The usual solution to this problem 
is to down load some weight from the airplane either in the form of external stores or fuel load. The 
question did not address the issue of jettisoning external stores to provide increased SEROC. The 
ability to jettison external stores allows the pilot to quickly (less than ten seconds on the S-3) reduce 
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the gross weight of the airplane in the event of an emergency. This is a decision that the aircrew 
should make during preflight takeoff computations and consideration should be given to reducing the 
weight of the aircraft prior to takeoff if jettisoning of external stores is the only way to achieve an 
acceptable SEROC. 
Question two of this section was a follow-on question to question one. If the response to 
question one was yes, then the survey asked what factor had the most significant impact on SEROC. 
Four multiple choice responses could be chosen from; temperature, field elevation, external stores, 
and insufficient thrust. The intent of this question was to determine what the aircrew felt the reason 
for their lack of SEROC was. Was it caused by extremely high air temperature? Was it a 
consequence of an unusually high field elevation such as NAS Fallon at 4,000 feet? Was it due to a 
greater than normal amount of external stores being carried? Or, was the lack of SEROC due simply 
to insufficient thrust being produced from the engine? 
The third question sought to determine the number of aircrew who had experienced actual 
single-engine flight and the number of occurrences if more than once. Question four followed in 
asking those who had experienced single-engine flight what phase of flight the single-engine situation 
developed. The intent of these questions was to help determine the frequency of single-engine 
operations and how often failures occur during takeoff situations. Question five asked specifically 
about the number of engine related malfunctions which did not involve an engine failure or shutdown 
but that did occur during the takeoff phase of flight. 
The final question in this section of the survey, question six, asked the aircrew if they had ever 
been required to jettison external stores in an effort to achieve increased SEROC, and if so how many 
times? The intent of this question was to determine how often aircrew found themselves in a situation 
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that was so critical that external stores were jettisoned. Usually this would involve an engine failure 
close to the ground with extreme conditions of weight, temperature or elevation. If a crew choose 
to jettison external stores it was because they needed an increased SEROC and they needed it right 
away. 
3. TF34 Performance Information 
Section three of the survey asked questions pertaining to the performance of the TF34 engine 
on both the S-3 and the ES-3 aircraft. While all the previous questions were multiple choice style, 
section three asked several short answer type questions in addition to multiple choice questions. 
Question one asked if the aircrew felt that the TF34 engines provided sufficient thrust for the 
mission of the S-3. If the answer was no, question two followed up by asking during what 
mission/flight phase is additional thrust required? Questions three and four were the same as 
questions one and two but pertained to the ES-3. The intent of these questions was to determine if 
there was a perception of insufficient thrust from the TF34 engines and if so during what 
mission/phase of flight. 
Question five asked what precautions must be taken if the engine T5 control system 
malfunctions or is disabled. Since T5 control malfunction is a NATOPS emergency procedure the 
author was confident that all aircrew would know the required steps of the procedure but the intent 
was to look for knowledge beyond simple memorization of procedures for an understanding of the 
T5 control system, its operation and purpose. 
The next question asked simply if the aircrew thought that the disabling of the T5 control 
system would provide any advantage in engine performance. Question seven followed it up by asking 
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those that replied yes what the perceived performance advantage would be. The intent of these 
questions was to measure the knowledge of the T5 system as it affects engine performance. 
The final questions, eight and nine, listed several methods for increasing SEROC and asked 
for recommendations and reasons why a particular method was chosen. Space was provided for 
additional methods that were not among those listed to be written in. The intent of these questions 
was to provide operator input into possible solutions to the stated problem of the lack of sufficient 
SEROC capabilities of the ES-3A aircraft. 
The surveys were designed to be of an anonymous nature and as such did not ask for name, 
rank, squadron or any identifying data other than designator and community. Space was provided 
at the conclusion of the survey for those with any additional comments or questions with regard to 
the TF34 engine or the survey to respond. 
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V. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will discuss the application of the methodology presented in the previous chapter. 
Results of the research effort will be presented along with the author's analysis of those results. The 
areas to be discussed include the use of the S-3 flight simulator to obtain engine thrust and 
performance data, the fleet engine fanspeed data collection, and the aircrew survey. 
B. USE OF S-3B FLIGHT SIMULATOR 
The S-3B OFT at NAS Cecil Field was utilized for data collection. Flight data used for 
collection of SEROC information was obtained utilizing OFT #2 which has full visual capabilities. 
Thrust model data was collected from both simulators, OFT #2 and OFT #5, with slight variation of 
raw data numbers between the two models being observed. 
A total of 24 separate SEROC flight experiments were conducted for various temperature 
ranges and aircraft gross weight settings as well as with the T5 control system both enabled and 
disabled. The pilot used to fly a given experiment was S-3B NATOPS qualified and fully current in 
all flight qualifications, representative of an average fleet pilot. Each experiment consisted of a 
standard takeoff event (no wind conditions) followed by an engine failure malfunction occurring just 
after rotation. If the experiment involved disabling the T5 control system, the simulator operator 
turned the cockpit switch off just after initiating the engine failure to approximate an APR system 
initiation. Aircraft landing gear was left in the down configuration and the pilot sought to obtain a 
stabilized rate-of-climb at military rated thrust (MRT, maximum throttle setting) and in accordance 
with NATOPS procedures for best single-engine rate-of-climb (15 units angle-of-attack (AOA), 
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aircraft banked three to five degrees into the good engine and maintaining aircraft track through 
moderate rudder input into the good engine). Once a stabilized SEROC was obtained, the experiment 
was considered completed and applicable information on experimental conditions and simulated flight 
data was recorded. In an effort to achieve unbiased climb performance, the pilot was not informed 
of what the NATOPS calculated SEROC values were expected to be. 
The use of the simulator thrust model for data collection was conducted by using the OFT 
instructor console to modify appropriate environmental parameters such as temperature, wind, and 
field elevation. Engine instrument readings were obtained from direct reading of OFT cockpit gauges 
and thrust readings were obtained directly from the instructor console performance screen readout. 
C.        RESULTS AND ANALYSIS OF SIMULATOR EXPERIMENTS 
A complete listing of the results of all experiments conducted in the simulator is included in 
spreadsheet form as Appendix D. In general SEROC performance in the OFT was slightly better than 
that predicted by NATOPS calculations for all experiments. The effects of disabling the T5 control 
system had a tremendous impact on the SEROC that was obtained. As aircraft gross weight and 
temperature values were increased, SEROC performance diminished as would be expected. 
However, the SEROC performance with the T5 control system disabled, expressed in terms of a 
percentage increase in SEROC capability for a given condition with T5 operating, consistently 
increased as takeoff conditions worsened. 
Experiments were conducted in sets of three at the same temperature and weight range, first 
with the T5 control system operating and then with it disabled. As an example, at a gross takeoff 
weight of 40,000 lbs and temperature of 60° F the average SEROC with T5 operating was 625 fpm 
as shown in the table "Effects of T5 on Rate-of-Climb" in Appendix D. In the table the first column 
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is TEMP (air temperature, °F), column two is ALT (altitude, field elevation), column three is WT 
(aircraft gross weight), column four is T/O SPD (NATOPS calculated takeoff speed), column five 
is DRAG (aircraft drag configuration), column six is GEAR (position of landing gear), column seven 
is S-3 NATOPS (calculated SEROC), column eight is ES-3 NATOPS (calculated SEROC), column 
nine is WITH T5 (SEROC obtained with T5 operating), column ten is W/O T5 (SEROC obtained with 
T5 disabled), and column eleven is S-3 % INCREASE (percent increase in SEROC for the S-3 with 
T5 disabled). With T5 disabled average SEROC rose to 1075 fpm, an increase of 72% in SEROC 
performance. Increasing the aircraft weight to 44,000 lbs with temperature still at 60° F yielded 
average numbers of 403 fpm with T5 and 883 fpm without, an increase of 119%. Maintaining the 
44,000 lb gross weight while increasing temperature to 80° F then 100° F showed the SEROC 
performance decreasing to average values of 208 fpm and 100 fpm with T5 and 608 fpm and 483 fpm 
without T5 respectively. While the nominal value of SEROC performance decreased, the measure 
of increased performance without the T5 control system operating increased from an average value 
of 208 fpm to 608 fpm (192%) at 80° F and from 100 fpm to 483 fpm (383%) at 100° F. SEROC 
performance increased most dramatically in the situations when it is most necessary, heavy aircraft 
on a hot day. 
The actual amount of SEROC obtained inflight is very much dependent on pilot flying 
technique; if the pilot does not maintain best SEROC airspeed (15 units AOA), the rate-of-climb will 
begin to decrease almost immediately. All performance figures obtained in the simulator are for 
analysis and comparison purposes only and are not meant to imply that these specific degrees of 
performance will be achievable in the aircraft. 
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The results of the experiments collected from the OFT thrust model were also encouraging 
as far as increased performance of the TF34 engine was concerned. Thrust model tests validated the 
degree of increased benefit of disabling the T5 control system as temperature increased as was 
illustrated in the SEROC test. The table "Altitude and Temperature Effects on TF34 Engine 
Parameters" in Appendix D illustrates this increased performance. Column one lists the engine 
parameters being measured, column two is MRT W/T5 (engine parameters with engine at full power 
and T5 operating), column three is MRT NO T5 (engine parameters with engine at full power and T5 
disabled), column four is % INCREASE (percent increase in thrust with T5 disabled), columns five, 
six, and seven provide the same data but at a field elevation of 4,000 ft. 
Measured net thrust improvement at MRT when disabling the T5 control system ranged from 
approximately 23% at 60° F to over 26% at temperatures of 100° F. These increases were consistent 
across the board in both OFTs and were observed regardless of the effects of wind, temperature, and 
elevation on net thrust produced. 
The table "Wind and Temperature Effects on TF34 Engine" in Appendix D illustrates the 
effects of environmental conditions on engine thrust produced. Column one is TEMP (air 
temperature, °F), column two is WIND (headwind component in knots), column three is WITH T5 
(thrust produced with T5 operating), column four is W/O T5 (thrust produced with T5 disabled), 
column five is % INCREASE (percent increase in thrust with T5 disabled), column six is WIND 
EFFECT (percent of original thrust with T5 operating due to ram air effects), and column seven is 
WIND W/O T5 (percent of original thrust with T5 disabled due to ram air effects). The "ram air" 
effects of increased airflow entering the engine intake, associated with wind and increasing airspeed, 
were consistently shown to result in a decrease of approximately 1.6% in net thrust per 10 knots of 
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ram air inflow. This "thrust lapse" with increased ram air inflow is consistent with characteristics of 
a high-bypass turbofan engines such as the TF34. [Ref. 14]. 
D.        USE OF FLEET ENGINE FAN SPEED DROOP CHECK 
Actual aircraft fanspeed datapoints were collected from two operational squadrons on the east 
coast, VS-22 and VS-31. Results of the data collection are contained in the table "TF34 Fanspeed 
Performance Check" found in Appendix E. Recorded data included squadron, aircraft bureau 
number, outside air temperature, altimeter setting, relative humidity, and headwind component. 
Engine performance data measured included target NF (fan speed), idle NF, NF with engines at 
military rated thrust (MRT), and NF with engines at MRT after approximately 30 seconds to measure 
amount of NF droop. A total of 34 flights events were recorded providing information on nine 
different aircraft (18 engines) over a two-week period. 
While this check of operational engines measured the amount of fan speed droop on a sample 
of current fleet engines, the OFT thrust model was able to display the effects of fan speed droop on 
net thrust produced by the engine. These effects are given in the table "Effects of NF Droop on 
Engine Thrust" found in Appendix E. Fan speed droop measurements were conducted in the OFT 
by incrementally reducing the throttle from MRT. Thrust was recorded from the instructor console 
performance screen at MRT and at each successive 100 rpm NF increment from MRT - 100 rpm to 
MRT - 400 rpm. Measurements were obtained with temperatures set at 60°, 80°, and 100° F and with 
headwind components of zero, 15, and 30 kts. The table illustrates the data collection and expresses 
the result of the simulated NF droop as a percentage of the original thrust value at MRT. For 
example, at 60° F with zero wind, thrust at MRT was 8,633 lb st. With a simulated NF droop of-200 
rpm NF, thrust decreased to 8,040 lb st or 93.13% of the original value. 
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E.   RESULTS AND ANALYSIS OF FAN SPEED DROOP CHECK 
With the total of 34 actual flight events recorded, individual engine performance was able to 
be measured 68 different times. Of the 68 engine performance checks performed, only 24 checks 
(35.3%) met or exceeded the NATOPS value for target fan speed at MRT. Following the 30-second 
waiting period to account for stabilized fan speed droop, only nine of the 68 engine checks (13.2%) 
met or exceeded target fan speed. Of the 59 times that the engines did not meet the targeted fan 
speed value after accounting for droop, the average value below target fanspeed was approximately 
125 rpm NF. 
A project conducted in 1981 and presented as a Naval Air Test Center Technical Report in 
1983 [Ref. 15] considered a proposal to accept reduced performance/thrust levels from the TF34 
engine. This study measured the effects of reduced engine performance, as measured by decreased 
NF values, on SEROC capabilities. Data analysis from the 1981 Naval Test Center project showed 
that for each 100 rpm reduction in fan speed approximately 65-70 fpm of SEROC capability was lost. 
Based on the data collected, 87% of the fleet S-3/ES-3 aircraft are flying with an average loss of 
approximately 81.25 to 87.50 fpm in expected SEROC capability. 
Thrust model data gathered from the OFT also showed the associated decrease in net thrust 
performance from reduced fan speed. A total of 45 experiments were conducted to illustrate the 
effects of fan speed droop on thrust produced by the engine. With temperature and wind variations 
included, the average engine thrust performance decline was in the range of 4 to 5% per 100 rpm of 
fan speed reduction. 
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F. USE OF AIRCREW SURVEY 
The aircrew survey was distributed to VS and VQ aircrews in both the Atlantic Fleet and the 
Pacific Fleet. The Atlantic Fleet squadrons selected for the survey are stationed at NAS Cecil Field, 
Jacksonville, FL. Surveys were distributed and responses were obtained from officers attached to 
Sea Control Wing U. S. Atlantic Fleet, Sea Control Squadrons TWENTY-TWO (VS-22) and 
THIRTY (VS-30), and Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron SIX (VQ-6). The Pacific Fleet 
squadrons selected for the survey are stationed at NAS North Island, San Diego, CA. Surveys were 
distributed and responses were obtained from officers attached to Sea Control Wing U. S. Pacific 
Fleet, Sea Control Squadrons THIRTY-FIVE (VS-35), FORTY-ONE (VS-41) and Fleet Air 
Reconnaissance Squadron FIVE (VQ-5). A total of 93 completed survey responses were received. 
1. Results of Survey 
Section One of the survey consisted of background information on the respondents. Items 
of interest included designator, community, and flight time breakdowns. Results of the background 
information are presented on the next page (Figure 5). 
Section two of the survey asked questions dealing with single-engine flight in the S-3/ES-3. 
The first question in this section asked if the aircrew had ever experienced takeoff conditions in which 
they would not have a calculated positive SEROC Of the 93 personnel surveyed, 41 (44.1%) stated 
that they had at some time experienced such conditions (Figure 6). Question two asked those that 
responded "yes" to the previous question what factor they felt had the most significant impact on their 
lack of SEROC capabilities. Answers were split almost evenly among the choices with air 
temperature being the most consistent response with over 30% of the 36 responses given (Figure 6). 
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AIRCREW SURVEY RESULTS 
BREAKDOWN OF DESIGNATOR AND COMMUNITY 
48 (51.6%) VS NFO 
27 (29.0%) VS PILOT 
12 (12.9%) VQ NFO 
6 (6.5%) VQ PILOT 
TOTAL NUMBER OF RESPONSES = 93 
AIRCREW SURVEY RESULTS 
BREAKDOWN OF TOTAL FLIGHT TIME 
18(19.4%)2000+FLTHRS 
25 (26.9%) 0-999 FLT HRS 
50 (53.8%) 1000-1999 FLT HRS 
ll?IA„LN.u.M?lR..0.FRESP.?^-s-E-s..= 93l 
Figure 5. Aircrew Survey Background Information. 
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AIRCREW SURVEY RESULTS 
Experienced takeoff conditions in which would not have positive SEROC? 
41 (44.1%) YES 
52 (55.9%) NO 
TOTAL NUMBER OF RESPONSES = 93 
AIRCREW SURVEY RESULTS 
What Factor Had Most Significant Impact on SEROC? 
9 (25.0%) INSUFFICIENT THRUST 
8 (22.2%) EXTERNAL STORES 
1 (30.6%) TEMPERATURE 
8 (22.2%) FIELD ELEVATION 
TOTAL NUMBER OF RESPONSES = 36] 
Figure 6. Takeoff Without Positive SEROC. 
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Question three asked if the aircrew had ever experienced actual single-engine flight, and if so 
how many times. Results showed that over 62% of the respondents had experienced at least one 
single-engine emergency situation (Figure 7). Experience of several separate single-engine failures 
was not uncommon as 14 of 93 (15.1%) responded that they had experienced three or more single- 
engine failures during their career. The next question asked those that had experienced single-engine 
flight what phase of flight the engine failure occurred. A vast majority (68.4%) occurred during the 
cruise or mission related phase of the flight while only four of 76 events (5.3%) occurred during 
takeoff (Figure 7). Question five asked about other engine related malfunctions that did not involve 
engine failure or shutdown yet occurred during the takeoff phase of flight. Of the 93 total responses 
one-third stated that they had experienced at least one engine-related malfunction during takeoff 
(Figure 8). 
The final question in this section, question six, asked if the aircrew had ever been required to 
jettison external stores in an effort to achieve an increased SEROC. Surprisingly, none of the 93 
aircrew surveyed had ever needed to jettison stores. 
Section three of the survey asked questions pertaining to the performance of the TF34 engine. 
The first question asked the aircrew if they felt that the TF34 engine provided sufficient thrust for the 
mission of the S-3. Two-thirds of those responding stated that they did not think the S-3 had 
sufficient thrust (Figure 9). The next question asked those that responded "no" to state what 
mission/phase of flight they thought required more thrust. Respondents could list as many areas as 
they wanted and 70 of 122 replies (57.4%) listed the takeoff/climbout phase of flight as being the 
most in need of additional thrust (Figure 9). 
48 
AIRCREW SURVEY RESULTS 
EXPERIENCED ACTUAL SINGLE-ENGINE EMERGENCY 
35 (37.6%) NO 
25 (26.9%) YES: ONCE 
19 (20.4%) YES: TWICE 
14 (15.1%) YES: THREE OR MORE 
TOTAL NUMBER OF RESPONSES = 93 
58 of 93 (62.4%) Have had at least 1 engine failure f 
AIRCREW SURVEY RESULTS 
PHASE OF FLIGHT SINGLE-ENGINE OCCURRED 
10 (13.2%) APPROACH / LANDING 4 (5.3%) TAKEOFF 
10(13.2%)CLIMBOUT 
52 (68.4%) CRUISE / MISSION 
ll?IA.LN.HMJE.!!.?f..!R.!.?.P--?^.S^E.!..= .7.^l 
Figure 7. Single-Engine Flight Experiences. 
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AIRCREW SURVEY RESULTS 
Experienced Engine Malfunction (other than shutdown/failure) During Takeoff 
9 (9.7%) YES: THREE OR MORE 10 (10.8%) YES: TWICE 
12 (12.9%) YES: ONCE 
62 (66.7%) NO 
TOTAL NUMBER OF RESPONSES = 93 
31 of 93 (33.3%) Have experienced at least one engine malfunction during takeoff 
Figure 8. Experienced Engine Malfunctions During Takeoff. 
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AIRCREW SURVEY RESULTS 
SUFFICIENT THRUST FOR MISSION OF THE S-3? 
30 (33.0%) YES 
61 (67.0%) NO 
[TOTAL NUMBER OF RESPONSES = 91 | 
AIRCREW SURVEY RESULTS 
WHEN DOES THE S-3 REQUIRE ADDITIONAL THRUST? 
70 (57.4%) TAKEOFF / CLIMBOUT 
5 (4.1%) OTHER 
7 (5.7%) APPROACH / LANDING 
40 (32.8%) CRUISE / MISSION 
[TOTAL NUMBER OF RESPONSES = 122] 
Figure 9. Thrust Requirements for Mission of the S-3. 
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The next two questions were the same as the previous two but with regard to the ES-3 rather 
than the S-3. Of the 55 responses, 45 (81.8%) did not think the ES-3 had sufficient thrust for its 
mission (Figure 10). As with the S-3, the flight phase identified as most in need of additional thrust 
was takeoff/climbout, generating two-thirds of the responses (Figure 10). 
The next question asked if the aircrew thought that disabling the engine's T5 system would 
provide any advantage in engine performance. Thirty-three of 93 response (35.5%) answered "yes" 
correctly, the remaining 64.5% stated that it would not or they did not know (Figure 11). 
The final question of the survey asked what method of improving SEROC would be most 
recommend. Almost 50% stated that new or improved engines would be the best method, only 4.7% 
stated that performance was satisfactory and no changes were required (Figure 11). 
2. Analysis of Survey Results 
In studying the results of the survey, several key areas are worthy of further discussion. First, 
41 of the 93 surveyed had experienced takeoff conditions without a positive SEROC. What occurs 
when conditions do not enable a positive SEROC? Ideally aircraft weight will be adjusted down by 
either downloading fuel or stores. However, this does not always happen. Interviews conducted with 
several aircrew indicated that operational necessity often prevails and that the aircraft are launched 
regardless of SEROC capabilities. The question that must be asked is when does "Operational 
Necessity" overrule prudent safety-of-flight considerations? Is it ever necessary to put an airplane 
and its crew in jeopardy, regardless of the probability of failure, or can steps be taken to ensure that 
these conditions will not routinely occur? 
Secondly, the question should not be "will an engine fail?", but rather,"when will an engine 
fail?" Survey results indicate a high probability that even with an inherently reliable engine such as 
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AIRCREW SURVEY RESULTS 
SUFFICIENT THRUST FOR MISSION OF THE ES-3? 
45 (81.8%) NO 
10 (18.2%) YES 
ITOTAL NUMBER OF RESPONSES = 55J| 
AIRCREW SURVEY RESULTS 
WHEN DOES THE ES-3 REQUIRE ADDITIONAL THRUST? 
66 (66.7%) TAKEOFF / CLIMBOUT 
4 (4.0%) OTHER 
12 (12.1%) APPROACH / LANDING 
17 (17.2%) CRUISE / MISSION 
[l?IAL!g^-^F-?--?F-RESF>-?-hJ-^ES =") 
Figure 10. Thrust Requirements for Mission of the ES-3. 
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AIRCREW SURVEY RESULTS 
WILL DISABLING T5 SYSTEM PROVIDE ANY PERFORMANCE ADVANTAGE? 
36 (38.7%) DON'T KNOW 33 (35.5%) YES 
24 (25.8%) NO 
TOTAL NUMBER OF RESPONSES = 93 
60 of 93 (64.5%) did not know correct answer 
AIRCREW SURVEY RESULTS 
RECOMMEND FOR IMPROVING SEROC PERFORMANCE OF S-3/ES-3 
42 (28.0%) DECREASE WEIGHT 27 (18.0%) APR SYSTEM 
Ik 
7 (4.7%) NO CHANGE REQUIRED 
74 (49.3%) NEW / IMPROVED ENGINES / AIRCRAFT 
TOTAL NUMBER OF RESPONSES = 150 
Figure 11. Disabling the T5 System; Recommendations for Improved SEROC. 
54 
the TF34 you will experience single-engine flight at least once during your career. Although the 
survey shows only four engine failures occurring during takeoff phase, the low number can be 
explained by the small amount of time spent in that particular phase of flight. In a typical three-hour 
flight, only about five minutes (or less than 3% of flight time) occurs in the takeoff phase yet this 
accounts for over 5% of the failures. If you include the climbout portion of flight, when SEROC 
capability would still be critical, then 18.5% of the reported failures occurred during a critical phase 
of flight. 
A third factor which is very important in this analysis is the fact that of those surveyed, no one 
has ever had to jettison external stores in order to achieve an increased SEROC. The results of this 
question would seem to indicate that regardless of the probability of engine failure occurring and, 
even if it does occur in the takeoff or climbout phase of flight, the chance of failure in which an 
improved SEROC is required for flight safety is extremely low. It is assumed that had additional 
SEROC been required an aircrew would have jettisoned stores. Without any external stores installed 
the S-3B would not require any increased SEROC. The ES-3 A, however, due to its higher base 
weight would not have a sufficient positive SEROC at temperatures above approximately 80° F even 
without any external stores loaded according to NATOPS performance charts. Since both aircraft 
routinely takeoff with both a drop tank and an aerial refueling store installed, it might be expected that 
external stores would have been required to have been jettisoned at some time. The question and its 
results illustrate (at least in this small sample size) that, based on aircrew experiences, an actual event 
requiring the immediate jettisoning of stores to provide for improved SEROC has not yet occurred. 
The survey does serve to clearly illustrate the perception of the fleet that neither aircraft 
presently possesses sufficient thrust for its mission.   It is interesting to note that just under five 
55 
percent reported that performance was satisfactory and no changes were required. The other 95%, 
as could be expected, were in favor of taking steps to improve the performance of their aircraft. The 
majority of responses indicated that if cost were not a factor, new engines would be the most 
desirable solution. Taking cost considerations into account, the most consistent answers included 
coupling improvements to the present engines with reductions in aircraft gross weight to achieve 
significantly better performance. While the takeoff/climbout phase was overwhelmingly listed as the 
phase of flight most in need of additional thrust, other mission areas where additional thrust 
capabilities would improve effectiveness were also mentioned. These areas included the mission 
tanker role, the ability to reach higher altitudes faster, and single-engine waveoff concerns. Thus, the 
fleet is not only aware of the lack of SEROC capabilities, but would also like to see improved engine 
performance in order to more effectively accomplish their missions. 
Results of the survey also point out a need for training in the area of engine systems and 
performance. This is illustrated by answers given to the questions concerning the engine T5 control 
system. When asked what precautions must be taken if the engine T5 control system malfunctions 
or is disabled many responded with the NATOPS immediate action memory item: THROTTLE - 
IDLE (move the throttle to the idle position). Several responded that interturbine temperature limits 
(ITT) must be closely observed but no one mentioned the CAUTION listed in the NATOPS manual: 
DO NOT USE ATS (Automatic Throttle System) WITH T5 DISABLED. The next question which 
asked about any performance advantage obtained from disabling the T5 system, just over one-third 
answered correctly. Of those who did answer correctly, many also commented that the extra 
performance was not without cost; "disabling T5 will probably cause overtemp and damage engine", 
was a typical reply. Almost two-thirds answered the question incorrectly or did not know enough 
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about the system to speculate. As a point of reference, this author, who has over 1,600 S-3 flight 
hours, was not aware of the performance benefits achievable by disabling the T5 system either until 
research into the subject began. Clearly, there is a need to get this information out to the fleet. 
Everyone should be aware of possible performance implications especially if there is potential for 
preventing a mishap. 
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VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.        SUMMARY 
The objective of this thesis was to provide an analytical, unbiased look at the performance of 
the TF34 engine as installed on the S-3 and ES-3 aircraft; specifically with regard to single-engine 
rate-of-climb (SEROC) capabilities and thrust requirements. The purpose being to provide Navy 
decision makers with information to assist in the effective management of proposals and 
improvements being considered under the TF34 Component Improvement Program (CIP). To 
achieve this objective of an evaluation of engine performance capabilities and requirements and in 
answer to the research questions stated in the Chapter One introduction, the following research 
procedures were conducted: 
• Background information concerning the CEP, S-3 and ES-3 aircraft, and the TF34 engine, 
was obtained and discussed in Chapter II. 
• A discussion of several new engine technologies and proposed methods being considered 
for improvement of SEROC performance was presented in Chapter II. 
• An analysis of two historical databases maintained by the Navy was conducted in an effort 
to determine the frequency of TF34 engine failure/inflight engine shutdown events. The 
results of this analysis of the Naval Aviation Logistics Data Analysis (NALDA) system and 
the Naval Safety Center database are presented in Chapter III. 
• An further analysis of historical engine failure data was conducted to determine the 
frequency of engine failure/shutdown events during the critical takeoff phase of flight. The 
results of this analysis are presented in Chapter III. 
• The S-3B Operational Flight Trainer (OFT) and associated engine thrust model was 
utilized in an effort to predict and measure the effects of proposed performance 
improvements on SEROC and engine thrust production. A discussion of the use of flight 
simulators as a research tool and results and analysis of data obtained in the simulator is 
presented in Chapters IV and V. 
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• Fleet engine data was obtained in an effort to assess the health of the engines currently in 
an operational status. A comparison of the performance of actual engine fan speed with 
NATOPS targeted fan speed was conducted. In addition to the data collected, a 
discussion of the characteristic of engine fanspeed (NF) droop and the use of the simulator 
thrust model to illustrate degraded engine performance is contained in Chapters IV and V. 
• A survey of S-3 and ES-3 aircrew was conducted to provide operator input into the 
research and to gather more specific historical data concerning actual experiences in the 
single-engine flight experiences. The survey methodology is presented in Chapter IV while 
results and analysis are discussed in Chapter V. 
B.        CONCLUSIONS 
The stated SEROC deficiency for the ES-3A aircraft is a valid safety-of-flight issue that 
deserves immediate attention. Although the analysis of historical engine data and the responses from 
aircrew on the survey indicated that the TF34 engine performance has been reliable and the likelihood 
of experiencing an engine failure during critical takeoff evolutions is small, the unnecessary risk to 
aircraft and crew cannot be condoned. Except in times of war or extreme operational necessity, 
aircrew should not be expected to take a jet flying if the possibility of an engine failure during takeoff 
leaves them no other option than to eject. The capability for improved SEROC performance exists 
right now with the current TF34 engine as illustrated in the simulator tests conducted. Through the 
disabling of the engine T5 control system or otherwise allowing the engine to be run hotter, sufficient 
thrust for an acceptable SEROC can be generated. 
The gains in performance obtained from allowing the engine to run hotter are not without 
detrimental consequences in an engine's life management. Thus, an acceptable economic balance 
between performance requirements and engine life needs to be determined. Current TF34 CIP 
projects are in place for the expressed purpose of increasing the service life and maintenance intervals 
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of the engine. Tradeoffs between performance and life management issues should be addressed in 
the specific CEP proposals for these projects. 
Although the proposed Automatic Power Reserve (APR) system has the capability to resolve 
the SEROC problem, it should not be viewed as the "fix" to the situation. Many details involved in 
the design and operation of such a system must still be worked out and at best would still leave the 
aircrew in a situation where they are relying on the system to work as advertised should an engine 
fail. You cannot assume that the system is going to work perfectly when required just as you can't 
assume that you'll be able to jettison external stores or raise the landing gear. The development 
required to make the system fool-proof would make it cost prohibitive and anything less than a 
perfectly reliable system would leave the aircraft in the same situation it's in right now. 
While the SEROC issue for the ES-3A is the only documented mission need for additional 
thrust, this thesis has shown that the general perception of the S-3 and ES-3 communities is that the 
aircraft does not have sufficient thrust to adequately meet mission requirements. A specific mission 
requirement that has tactical considerations is that of mission tanker. With the retiring of the A-6 
aircraft from the Navy inventory, the S-3B/ES-3 A aircraft are now the only organic tankers for the 
carrier air wing. The S-3 is capable of meeting all requirements as a recovery or overhead tanker. 
As a mission tanker, however, the S-3 leaves a lot to be desired. With the composition of the carrier 
air wing continuing to evolve with increasing numbers of F/A-18 aircraft, the mission tanker role 
becomes more and more critical. Increased thrust would help to make the S-3 a more suitable 
mission tanker and provide greater organic capability to the air wing. 
The problem of fan speed droop is not one that is going to go away. As the engines get older, 
performance will continue to decline.  Fanspeed droop is a characteristic of the engine that will 
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continue. However, performance improvements should take the droop factor into account and 
provide an adequate margin of excess thrust such that droop is not considered critical. The TF34 
Program Management Team is currently studying the problem in an attempt to quantify the effects 
of fanspeed droop and determine necessary thrust requirements. Many fleet aircraft are not meeting 
the current NATOPS criteria for target fan speed value. If this target value is indeed GO/NO-GO 
criteria for the engine, then engine performance must be increased or the NATOPS target values 
must be adjusted down. 
The performance charts in the S-3B NATOPS manual are based on flight tests conducted in 
1978 utilizing an S-3A aircraft with relatively new engines and do not take into consideration the 
effects of engine age and wear on performance. Fortunately, the ES-3 A performance data is current 
with the flight profiles having been flown in 1993. If the issues of engine performance and thrust 
requirements are to be properly addressed, current, accurate aircraft performance data must be 
available. 
There is a need for education of aircrew in important aspects of the engine, its systems, and 
performance factors. The fleet needs to know information that has the potential to save an aircraft 
and the crew. Although disabling the T5 system will cause an overtemp on the operating engine, that 
cost is insignificant compared to the cost of a Class A mishap. The T5 system disable should not be 
used indiscriminately, but, in certain situations it may provide the aircrew with enough extra thrust 
capability to avoid a mishap. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the research results the following recommendations are proposed: 
• Take the steps necessary to solve the stated deficiency in ES-3A SEROC as soon as 
possible. New engines or an APR system are not required. By simply increasing the 
engine operating temperature limits sufficient thrust to maintain an adequate SEROC can 
be obtained. 
• Conduct an engine performance/life management tradeoff analysis to determine how much 
increased performance can be obtained without having a significant detrimental effect on 
engine reliability, maintainability, and availability. 
• Conduct flight tests with the S-3B aircraft to obtain more current performance charts for 
the NATOPS manual. These tests can determine the effect of engine age and wear on 
performance parameters and will provide aircrew with more realistic data for flight 
planning purposes. 
• A change to the S-3/ES-3 NATOPS manuals should be made to ensure that all aircrew are 
aware of the performance and engine life implications of operating the TF34 engine with 
the T5 control system disabled. 
• The VS and VQ communities must document their need for increased engine performance 
for specific missions. When a valid mission need is clearly articulated the acquisition 
system can begin the steps necessary to fulfill the need. 
By implementing these recommendations, the Navy can be assured that the S-3 and ES-3 
aircraft will be able to safely and effectively accomplish their assigned missions throughout the 
remainder of their planned operational service life. 
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APPENDIX A. NALDADATA 
This appendix contains the complete listing of data generated by the requested query of the 
NALDA database for all TF34 engine-related malfunctions which were reported with an inflight 
abort. The data is presented in spreadsheet format and is sorted by month and year of occurrence, 
failure code and nomenclature, number of engines which reported the failure for the time period, and 
the total flight hours for the time period. 
65 
DATE FAILURE NOMENCLATURE EVENTS FLT HRS 
1 7601 37 FLUCTUATES,UNSTABLE FREQ RPM 2 2755 
2 7601 334 TEMPERATURE INCORRECT 2 2755 
3 7601 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 2 2755 
4 7601 730 LOOSE 2 2755 
5 7602 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 2 2669 
6 7602 306 CONTAMINATION.NON METTALIC DIRTY 2 2669 
7 7602 730 LOOSE 2 2669 
8 7603 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 2 3524 
9 7603 730 LOOSE 2 3524 
10 7604 37 FLUCTUATES,UNSTABLE FREQ RPM 2 3991 
11 7604 127 ADJUSTMENT/ALIGNMENT IMPROPER 2 3991 
12 7604 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 2 3991 
13 7604 318 DECELERATION IMPROPER 2 3991 
14 7604 823 NO START 2 3991 
15 7605 69 FLAME OUT 2 3788 
16 7605 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 4 3788 
17 7606 127 ADJUSTMENT/ALIGNMENT IMPROPER 2 3914 
18 7606 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 8 3914 
19 7606 525 PRESSURE INCORRECT 2 3914 
20 7607 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 2 3687 
21 7607 306 CONTAMINATION.NON METTALIC DIRTY 2 3687 
22 7607 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 2 3687 
23 7608 180 CLOGGED,OBSTRUCTED,PLUGGED 2 3856 
24 7608 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 2 3856 
25 7608 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 2 3856 
26 7608 410 LACK OF LUBRICATION 2 3856 
27 7609 180 CLOGGED,OBSTRUCTED,PLUGGED 2 4228 
28 7609 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 2 4228 
29 7609 334 TEMPERATURE INCORRECT 2 4228 
30 7609 410 LACK OF LUBRICATION 2 4228 
31 7610 170 CORRODED 2 4686 
32 7610 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 6 4686 
33 7610 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 2 4686 
34 7610 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 2 4686 
35 7610 730 LOOSE 2 4686 
36 7611 180 CLOGGED.OBSTRUCTED,PLUGGED 2 3856 
37 
38 
7611 306 CONTAMINATION.NON METTALIC DIRTY 4 3856 
7612 37 FLUCTUATES.UNSTABLE FREQ RPM 2 3728 
39 7612 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 2 3728 
40 7612 306 CONTAMINATION.NON METTALIC DIRTY 2 3728 
41 7701 69 FLAME OUT 2 4370 
42 7701 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 8 4370 
43 7701 304 FOD-INGESTION OF A/C PART 2 4370 
44 7701 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 2 4370 
45 7702 37 FLUCTUATES.UNSTABLE FREQ RPM 2 4450 
46 7702 127 ADJUSTMENT/ALIGNMENT IMPROPER 2 4450 
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47 7702 372 METAL IN OIL STRAINER FILTER 2 4450 
48 7702 410 LACK OF LUBRICATION 2 4450 
49 7703 185 CONTAMINATION 2 4992 
50 7703 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 4 4992 
51 7703 525 PRESSURE INCORRECT 2 4992 
52 7704 127 ADJUSTMENT/ALIGNMENT IMPROPER 2 4949 
53 7704 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 4 4949 
54 7704 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 2 4949 
55 7704 730 LOOSE 2 4949 
56 7705 37 FLUCTUATES,UNSTABLE FREQ RPM 2 5386 
57 7705 117 DETERIORATED/ERODED 2 5386 
58 7705 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 2 5386 
59 7705 690 VIBRATION EXCESSIVE 2 5386 
60 7706 37 FLUCTUATES.UNSTABLE FREQ RPM 2 5581 
61 7706 127 ADJUSTMENT/ALIGNMENT IMPROPER 4 5581 
62 7706 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 2 5581 
63 7707 70 BROKEN,BURST,CUT,TORN 2 4809 
64 7707 190 CRACKED.CRAZED 2 4809 
65 7707 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 4 4809 
66 7707 282 LOW OUTPUT.READING OR VALUE 2 4809 
67 7707 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 10 4809 
68 7707 730 LOOSE 2 4809 
69 7707 823 NO START 2 4809 
70 7708 127 ADJUSTMENT/ALIGNMENT IMPROPER 2 5453 
71 7708 185 CONTAMINATION 2 5453 
72 7708 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 8 5453 
73 7708 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 2 5453 
74 7708 615 SHORTED 2 5453 
75 7708 730 LOOSE 2 5453 
76 7709 37 FLUCTUATES.UNSTABLE FREQ RPM 4 5710 
77 7709 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 6 5710 
78 7709 372 METAL IN OIL STRAINER FILTER 2 5710 
79 7709 696 FLUID LOW 2 5710 
80 7710 70 BROKEN,BURST,CUT,TORN 2 4847 
81 7710 177 FUEL FLOW INCORRECT 2 4847 
82 7710 180 CLOGGED.OBSTRUCTED.PLUGGED 2 4847 
83 7710 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 4 4847 
84 7710 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 2 4847 
85 7712 108 BROKEN OR MISSING SAFETY WIRE 2 4594 
86 7712 372 METAL IN OIL STRAINER FILTER 2 4594 
87 7712 730 LOOSE 2 4594 
88 7712 823 NO START 2 4594 
89 7801 185 CONTAMINATION 2 5002 
90 7801 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 2 5002 
91 7802 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 4 4947 
92 
93 
7802 525 PRESSURE INCORRECT 6 4947 
7803 127 ADJUSTMENT/ALIGNMENT IMPROPER 4 5746 
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94 7803     I      525 PRESSURE INCORRECT 2 5746 
95 7804     !        8 NOISY 2 5236 
96 7804 127 ADJUSTMENT/ALIGNMENT IMPROPER 2 5236 
97 7804 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 8 5236 
98 7804 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 4 5236 
99 7804 823 NO START 2 5236 
100 7805 37 FLUCTUATES.UNSTABLE FREQ RPM 2 7830 
101 7805 127 ADJUSTMENT/ALIGNMENT IMPROPER 2    _, 7830 
102 7805 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 6 7830 
103 7805 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 2 7830 
104 7805 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 4 7830 
105 7805 696 FLUID LOW 2 7830 
106 7806 127 ADJUSTMENT/ALIGNMENT IMPROPER 2 4909 
107 7806 160 CONTACT/CONNECTION DEFECTIVE 2 4909 
108 7806 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 8 4909 
109 7807 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 2 4947 
110 7808 8 NOISY 2 6135 
111 7808 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 6 6135 
112 7808 372 METAL IN OIL STRAINER FILTER 2 6135 
113 7808 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 2 6135 
114 7808 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 2 6135 
115 7808 730 LOOSE 2 6135 
116 7809 37 FLUCTUATES.UNSTABLE FREQ RPM 2 4960 
117 7809 69 FLAME OUT 2 4960 
118 7809 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 2 4960 
119 7809 334 TEMPERATURE INCORRECT 2 4960 
120 7809 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 2 4960 
121 7809 525 PRESSURE INCORRECT 2 4960 
122 7810 135 BINDING STUCK OR JAMMED 2 5811 
123 7810 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 4 5811 
124 7810 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 2 5811 
125 7810 537 LOW POWER OR THRUST 2 5811 
126 7811 170 CORRODED 2 4517 
127 7811 180 CLOGGED,OBSTRUCTED,PLUGGED 2 4517 
128 7811 185 CONTAMINATION 2 4517 
129 7811 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 6 4517 
130 7811 525 PRESSURE INCORRECT 2 4517 
131 7811 690 VIBRATION EXCESSIVE 2 4517 
132 7811 730 LOOSE 2 4517 
133 7812 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 2 4078 
134 7812 334 TEMPERATURE INCORRECT 2 4078 
135 7812 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 2 4078 
136 7901 127 ADJUSTMENT/ALIGNMENT IMPROPER 2 4713 
137 7901 161 OUTPUT INCORRECT 4 4713 
138 7901 180 CLOGGED.OBSTRUCTED.PLUGGED 2 4713 
139 7901 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 4 4713 
140 7901 303 FOD-BIRD STRIKE DAMAGE 2 4713 
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141 7901 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 2 4713 
142 7902 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 4 4791 
143!     7902 615 SHORTED 2 4791 
144 7903 170 CORRODED 2 5423 
145 7903 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 8 5423 
146 7903 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 2 5423 
147 7904 37 FLUCTUATES.UNSTABLE FREQ RPM 2 5007 
148 7904 69 FLAME OUT 2 5007 
149 7904 127 ADJUSTMENT/ALIGNMENT IMPROPER 4 5007 
150 7904 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 4 5007 
151 7904 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 4 5007 
152 7904 398 OIL CONSUMPTION EXCESSIVE 2 5007 
153 7904 410 LACK OF LUBRICATION 2 5007 
154 7905 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 2 4950 
155 7905 334 TEMPERATURE INCORRECT 2 4950 
156 7905 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 2 4950 
157 7905 766 OUT OF SPEC 4 4950 
158 7906 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 8 4695 
159 7906 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 4 4695 
160 7906 900 BURNED OR OVERHEATED 2 4695 
161 7907 37 FLUCTUATES.UNSTABLE FREQ RPM 2 3438 
162 7907 106 MISSING BOLTS,NUTS,SCREWS,ETC. 2 3438 
163 7907 180 CLOGGED,OBSTRUCTED,PLUGGED 2 3438 
164 7907 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 4 3438 
165 7907 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 2 3438 
166 7907 690 VIBRATION EXCESSIVE 2 3438 
167 7908 127 ADJUSTMENT/ALIGNMENT IMPROPER 2 4668 
168 7908 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 2 4668 
169 7909 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 2 4180 
170 7910 127 ADJUSTMENT/ALIGNMENT IMPROPER 2 4627 
171 7910 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 10 4627 
172 7911 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 4 3957 
173 7911 306 CONTAMINATION.NON METTALIC DIRTY 2 3957 
174 7912 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN L       10 3472 
175 8002 161 OUTPUT INCORRECT 2 4267 
176 
177 
8002 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 4 4267 
8003 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 4 5281 
178 8003 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 6 5281 
179 8004 37 FLUCTUATES.UNSTABLE FREQ RPM 2 4498 
180 8004 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 6 4498 
181 8004 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 2 4498 
182 8004 730 LOOSE 2 4498 
183 8005 177 FUEL FLOW INCORRECT 2 5179 
184 8005 180 CLOGGED,OBSTRUCTED,PLUGGED 2 5179 
185 8005 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 2 5179 
186 8005 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 2 5179 
187 8005 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 2 5179 
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188 8005 525 PRESSURE INCORRECT 4 5179 
189 8005 801 NO DEFECT-REMOVED FOR MODIFICATION 2 5179 
190 8006 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 2 5047 
191 8006 282 LOW OUTPUT.READING OR VALUE 4 5047 
192 8006 306 CONTAMINATION.NON METTALIC DIRTY 2 5047 
193 8006 410 LACK OF LUBRICATION 2 5047 
194 8006     i      730 LOOSE 2 5047 
195 8007     j      242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 6 5625 
196 8007 525 PRESSURE INCORRECT 2 5625 
197 8007 690 VIBRATION EXCESSIVE 2 5625 
198 8008 37 FLUCTUATES,UNSTABLE FREQ RPM 2 4307 
199 8008 127 ADJUSTMENT/ALIGNMENT IMPROPER 2 4307 
200 8008 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 16 4307 
201 8008 525 PRESSURE INCORRECT 2 4307 
202 8009 127 ADJUSTMENT/ALIGNMENT IMPROPER 2 4984 
203 8009 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 4 4984 
204 8009 334 TEMPERATURE INCORRECT 2 4984 
205 8009 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 4 4984 
206 8009 410 LACK OF LUBRICATION 2 4984 
207 8010 127 ADJUSTMENT/ALIGNMENT IMPROPER 2 4419 
208 8010 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 4 4419 
209 8010    j 334 TEMPERATURE INCORRECT 2 4419 
210 8010 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 2 4419 
211 8010 730 LOOSE 2 4419 
212 8011 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 10 4803 
213 8012 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 6 4318 
214 8012 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 2 4318 
215 8101 127 ADJUSTMENT/ALIGNMENT IMPROPER 2 4754 
216 8101 135 BINDING STUCK OR JAMMED 2 4754 
217 . 8101 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 10 4754 
218 8101 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 4 4754 
219 8102 127 ADJUSTMENT/ALIGNMENT IMPROPER 2 4655 
220 8102 177 FUEL FLOW INCORRECT 2 4655 
221 8102 306 CONTAMINATION.NON METTALIC DIRTY 2 4655 
222 8102 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 2 4655 
223 8103 160 CONTACT/CONNECTION DEFECTIVE 2 4733 
224 8103 190 CRACKED.CRAZED 2 4733 
225 8103 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 4 4733 
226 8103 304 FOD-INGESTION OF A/C PART 2 4733 
227 8103 334 TEMPERATURE INCORRECT 2 4733 
228 8104 37 FLUCTUATES.UNSTABLE FREQ RPM 2 4830 
229 8104 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 6 4830 
230 8105 106 MISSING BOLTS,NUTS,SCREWS,ETC. 2 5425 
231 8105 127 ADJUSTMENT/ALIGNMENT IMPROPER 6 5425 
232 8105 410 LACK OF LUBRICATION 2 5425 
233 8106 70 BROKEN,BURST,CUT,TORN 2 5417 
234 8106 127 ADJUSTMENT/ALIGNMENT IMPROPER 2 5417 
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235 8106 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 4 5417 
236 8107 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 2 5028 
237 8107 350 INSULATION BREAKDOWN 2 5028 
238 8108 37 FLUCTUATES,UNSTABLE FREQ RPM 2 5140 
239|     8108 160 CONTACT/CONNECTION DEFECTIVE 2 5140 
240!     8108 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 4 5140 
241 8108 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 2 5140 
242 8109 127 ADJUSTMENT/ALIGNMENT IMPROPER 2 5509 
243 8109 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 4 5509 
244 8109 690 VIBRATION EXCESSIVE 2 5509 
245 8110 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 4 4440 
246 8111 177 FUEL FLOW INCORRECT 2 4918 
247 8111 180 CLOGGED.OBSTRUCTED.PLUGGED 2 4918 
248 8111 282 LOW OUTPUT.READING OR VALUE 2 4918 
249 8111 306 CONTAMINATION.NON METTALIC DIRTY 2 4918 
250 8112 37 FLUCTUATES.UNSTABLE FREQ RPM 2 3704 
251 8112 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 2 3704 
252 8112 730 LOOSE 2 3704 
253 8201 69 FLAME OUT 2 4814 
254 8201 70 BROKEN,BURST,CUT,TORN 2 4814 
255 8201 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 4 4814 
256 8201 315 RPM FLUCTUATION OR INCORRECT 2 4814 
257 8201 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 4 4814 
258 8202 161 OUTPUT INCORRECT 2 4484 
259 8202 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 4 4484 
260 8202 350 INSULATION BREAKDOWN 2 4484 
261 8202 410 LACK OF LUBRICATION 2 4484 
262 8202 730 LOOSE 2 4484 
263 8203 37 FLUCTUATES.UNSTABLE FREQ RPM 2 4941 
264 8203 303 FOD-BIRD STRIKE DAMAGE 2 4941 
265 8203 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 4 4941 
266 8204 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 6 5154 
267 8205 37 FLUCTUATES.UNSTABLE FREQ RPM 2 4406 
268 8205 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 2 4406 
269 8205 730 LOOSE 2 4406 
270 8206 37 FLUCTUATES.UNSTABLE FREQ RPM 2 4771 
271 8206 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 4 4771 
272 8206 282 LOW OUTPUT.READING OR VALUE 2 4771 
273 8206 306 CONTAMINATION.NON METTALIC DIRTY 2 4771 
274 8206 730 LOOSE 2 4771 
275 8206 922 OVERTEMP LIMITS EXCEEDED(EMS) 2 4771 
276 8209 20 WORN.STRIPPED.CHAFFED.FRAYED 2 5137 
277 8209 69 FLAME OUT 2 5137 
278 8209 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 4 5137 
279 8209 282 LOW OUTPUT.READING OR VALUE 2 5137 
280 8209 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 2 5137 
281 8209 525 PRESSURE INCORRECT 2 5137 
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282 8210   j 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 2 5554 
283 8210 696 FLUID LOW 2 5554 
284 8210 730 LOOSE 2 5554 
285 8211 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 2 3654 
286 8211 334 TEMPERATURE INCORRECT 2 3654 
287 8211 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 2 3654 
288 8212 170 CORRODED 2 3999 
789 8212 730 LOOSE 2 3999 
290 8301   _, 185 CONTAMINATION 2 4838 
291 8301 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 4 4838 
292 8301 334 TEMPERATURE INCORRECT 2 4838 
293 8301 410 LACK OF LUBRICATION 2 4838 
294 8302 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 10 3851 
295 8303 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 2 6076 
296 8303 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 4 6076 
297 8303 707 SHORTED, INTERNAL 2 6076 
298 8303 730 LOOSE 4 6076 
299 8304 37 FLUCTUATES,UNSTABLE FREQ RPM 6 5404 
300 8304 184 UNDECODED 2 5404 
301 8304 185 CONTAMINATION 2 5404 
302 8304 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 2 5404 
303 8305 230 DIRTY 2 5261 
304 8305 304 FOD-INGESTION OF A/C PART 2 5261 
305 8305 334 TEMPERATURE INCORRECT 2 5261 
306 8305 373 METAL CONTAMINATION-CHIP DETECTOR 2 5261 
307 8306 127 ADJUSTMENT/ALIGNMENT IMPROPER 2 3951 
308 8306 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 4 3951 
309 8306 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 2 3951 
310 8306 410 LACK OF LUBRICATION 2 3951 
311 8306 684 NO OR WEAK STABILIZATION 2 3951 
312 8306 730 LOOSE 2 3951 
313 8307 70 BROKEN,BURST,CUT,TORN 2 3980 
314 8307 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 2 3980 
315 8307 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 6 3980 
316 8308 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 6 5930 
317 8308 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 2 5930 
318 8308 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 4 5930 
319 8309 127 ADJUSTMENT/ALIGNMENT IMPROPER 2 4365 
320 8309 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 4 4365 
3?1 8310 37 FLUCTUATES.UNSTABLE FREQ RPM 2 5068 
322 8310 127 ADJUSTMENT/ALIGNMENT IMPROPER 2 5068 
323 8310 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 4 5068 
324 8310 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 4 5068 
325 8311 37 FLUCTUATES.UNSTABLE FREQ RPM 2 5073 
326 8311 127 ADJUSTMENT/ALIGNMENT IMPROPER 2 5073 
327 8311 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 8 5073 
328 8311 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 2 5073 
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329 8311 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 2 5073 
330 8312 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 2 4263 
331 8401 180 CLOGGED.OBSTRUCTED,PLUGGED 4761 
332 8401 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 4761 
333 8401 410 LACK OF LUBRICATION 4761 
334 8402 20 WORN,STRIPPED,CHAFFED,FRAYED 5731 
335 8402 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 5731 
336 8402 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 5731 
337 8402 410 LACK OF LUBRICATION 5731 
338 8403 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 6252 
339 8403 306 CONTAMINATION.NON METTALIC DIRTY 6252 
340 8403 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 6252 
341 8403 690 VIBRATION EXCESSIVE 6252 
342 8403 730 LOOSE 6252 
343 8404 127 ADJUSTMENT/ALIGNMENT IMPROPER 4203 
344 8404 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 4203 
345 8404 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 4203 
346 8404 525 PRESSURE INCORRECT 4203 
347 8406 127 ADJUSTMENT/ALIGNMENT IMPROPER 5139 
348 8407 180 CLOGGED,OBSTRUCTED,PLUGGED 4869 
349 8407 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 4869 
350 8407 304 FOD-INGESTION OF A/C PART 4869 
351 8408 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 5799 
352 8408 303 FOD-BIRD STRIKE DAMAGE 5799 
353 8408 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 5799 
354 8409 1 GASSY 4475 
355 8409 329 STARTING STALL/HUNG START 4475 
356 8410 20 WORN,STRIPPED,CHAFFED,FRAYED 5518 
357 8410 127 ADJUSTMENT/ALIGNMENT IMPROPER 5518 
358 8410 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 5518 
359 8411 37 FLUCTUATES.UNSTABLE FREQ RPM 4766 
360 8411 70 BROKEN,BURST,CUT,TORN 4766 
361 8411 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 4766 
362 8412 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 4075 
363 8412 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 4075 
364 8502 170 CORRODED 4418 
365 8502 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 3 4418 
366 8503 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 5507 
367 8503 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 5507 
368 8504 37 FLUCTUATES.UNSTABLE FREQ RPM 5143 
369 8504 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 3 5143 
370 8504 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 5143 
371 8505 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 5262 
372 8505 690 VIBRATION EXCESSIVE 5262 
373 8505 730 LOOSE 5262 
374 8506 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 4692 
375 8506 730 LOOSE 4692 
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376 8507 69 FLAME OUT 5807 
377 8507 180 CLOGGED,OBSTRUCTED,PLUGGED 5807 
378 8507 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 2 5807 
379 8508 304 FOD-INGESTION OF A/C PART 5759 
380 8508 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 5759 
381 8508 410 LACK OF LUBRICATION 5759 
382 8508            525 PRESSURE INCORRECT 5759 
383 8509     i      242      , FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 3 5276 
384 8509 306 CONTAMINATION.NON METTALIC DIRTY 5276 
385 8510 20 WORN,STRIPPED,CHAFFED,FRAYED 5336 
386 8510 69 FLAME OUT 5336 
387 8510 334 TEMPERATURE INCORRECT 5336 
388 8510 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 5336 
389 8510 525 PRESSURE INCORRECT 5336 
390 8511 37 FLUCTUATES,UNSTABLE FREQ RPM 4858 
391 8511 70 BROKEN, BURST.CUT.TORN 4858 
392 8511 306 CONTAMINATION.NON METTALIC DIRTY 4858 
393 8511     A 922 OVERTEMP LIMITS EXCEEDED(EMS) 4858 
394 8512 20 WORN,STRIPPED,CHAFFED,FRAYED 4211 
395 8512 37 FLUCTUATES.UNSTABLE FREQ RPM 4211 
396 8512 135 BINDING STUCK OR JAMMED 4211 
397 8512 180 CLOGGED,OBSTRUCTED,PLUGGED 4211 
398 8512 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 3 4211 
399 8512 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 4211 
400 8601 70 BROKEN,BURST,CUT,TORN 5518 
401 8601 190 CRACKED,CRAZED 5518 
402 8601 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 2 5518 
403 8601 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 5518 
404 8601 730 LOOSE 5518 
405 8601 823 NO START 5518 
406 8602 242 FAILED TO OPERATE REASON UNKNOWN 5769 
407 8602 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 5769 
408 8602 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 5769 
409 8603 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 2 5319 
410 8603 537 LOW POWER OR THRUST 5319 
411 8604 306 CONTAMINATION.NON METTALIC DIRTY 5946 
412 8604 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 5946 
413 8604 703 PROGRAM FAILURE 5946 
414 8605 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 2 5289 
415 8606 127 ADJUSTMENT/ALIGNMENT IMPROPER 5391 
416 8606 525 PRESSURE INCORRECT 5391 
417 8607 458 OUT OF BALANCE 5134 
418 8607 525 PRESSURE INCORRECT 2 5134 
419 8608 20 WORN,STRIPPED,CHAFFED,FRAYED 5423 
420 8608 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 5423 
421 8609 185 CONTAMINATION 5416 
422 8609 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 2 5416 
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423 8610 37 FLUCTUATES.UNSTABLE FREQ RPM 5770 
424 8610 69 FLAME OUT 5770 
425 8610 320 ENGINE COMPRESSOR STALLS 5770 
426 8610 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 2 5770 
427 8611 20 WORN,STRIPPED,CHAFFED,FRAYED 5622 
428 8611 70 BROKEN,BURST,CUT,TORN 5622 
429 8611 185 CONTAMINATION 5622 
430 8611 320 ENGINE COMPRESSOR STALLS 5622 
431 8611 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 3 5622 
432 8612 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 4 4085 
433 8701 127 ADJUSTMENT/ALIGNMENT IMPROPER 4634 
434 8701 190 CRACKED,CRAZED 4634 
435 8701 320 ENGINE COMPRESSOR STALLS 4634 
436 8702 37 FLUCTUATES.UNSTABLE FREQ RPM 4600 
437 8702 127 ADJUSTMENT/ALIGNMENT IMPROPER 4600 
438 8702 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 4600 
439 8702 690 VIBRATION EXCESSIVE 4600 
440 8703 314 ACCELERATION IMPROPER 4917 
441 8703 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 2 4917 
442 8704 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 2 5312 
443 8705 37 FLUCTUATES.UNSTABLE FREQ RPM 5333 
444 8705 127 ADJUSTMENT/ALIGNMENT IMPROPER 5333 
445 8705 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 5333 
446 8705 525 PRESSURE INCORRECT 5333 
447 8706 37 FLUCTUATES.UNSTABLE FREQ RPM 2 5493 
448 8706 334 TEMPERATURE INCORRECT 5493 
449 8706 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 2 5493 
450 8707 37 FLUCTUATES.UNSTABLE FREQ RPM 5396 
451 8707 160 CONTACT/CONNECTION DEFECTIVE 5396 
452 8707 320 ENGINE COMPRESSOR STALLS 5396 
453 8707 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 5396 
454 8708 185 CONTAMINATION 5405 
455 8708 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 2 5405 
456 8708 398 OIL CONSUMPTION EXCESSIVE 5405 
457 8708 615 SHORTED 5405 
458 8708 823 NO START 5405 
459 8709 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 5294 
460 8710 306 CONTAMINATION.NON METTALIC DIRTY 5409 
461 8710 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 3 5409 
462 8711 69 FLAME OUT 4536 
463 8711 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 2 4536 
464 8711 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 4536 
465 8712 37 FLUCTUATES.UNSTABLE FREQ RPM 3820 
466 8801 69 FLAME OUT 4497 
467 8801 127 ADJUSTMENT/ALIGNMENT IMPROPER 4497 
468 8801 290 FAILS DIAGNOSTIC AUTOMATIC TEST 4497 
469 8801 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 4497 
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470 8801 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 1 4497 
471 8801 525 PRESSURE INCORRECT 1 4497 
472 8802 37 FLUCTUATES,UNSTABLE FREQ RPM 1 4786 
473 8802 314 ACCELERATION IMPROPER 1       J 4786 
474 8802 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 2 4786 
475 8802 900 BURNED OR OVERHEATED 1 4786 
476 8803 37 FLUCTUATES.UNSTABLE FREQ RPM 1 5476 
477 8803 320 ENGINE COMPRESSOR STALLS 1 5476 
478 8803 823 NO START 1 5476 
479 8804 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 5 5217 
480 8804 690 VIBRATION EXCESSIVE 1 5217 
481 8805 37 FLUCTUATES.UNSTABLE FREQ RPM 1 5312 
482 8805 70 BROKEN,BURST,CUT,TORN 1 5312 
483 8805 127 ADJUSTMENT/ALIGNMENT IMPROPER 1 5312 
484 8805 185 CONTAMINATION 1 5312 
485 8805 525 PRESSURE INCORRECT 1 5312 
486 8806 160 CONTACT/CONNECTION DEFECTIVE 1 5215 
487 8806 282 LOW OUTPUT.READING OR VALUE 1 5215 
488 8806 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 2 5215 
489 8806 922 OVERTEMP LIMITS EXCEEDED(EMS) 1 5215 
490 8807 180 CLOGGED.OBSTRUCTED.PLUGGED 1 4781 
491 8807 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 2 4781 
492 8807 766 OUT OF SPEC 1 4781 
493 8808 70 BROKEN,BURST,CUT,TORN 1 5140 
494 8808 180 CLOGGED.OBSTRUCTED.PLUGGED 1 5140 
495 8808 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 2 5140 
496 8808 410 LACK OF LUBRICATION 2 5140 
497 8809 70 BROKEN,BURST,CUT,TORN 1 5974 
498 8809 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 1 5974 
499 8809 537 LOW POWER OR THRUST 1 5974 
500 8810 127 ADJUSTMENT/ALIGNMENT IMPROPER 1 4697 
501 8810 180 CLOGGED.OBSTRUCTED.PLUGGED 1 4697 
502 8810 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 2 4697 
503 8810 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 1 4697 
504 8811 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 4 5037 
505 8812 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 4 4569 
506 8901 180 CLOGGED.OBSTRUCTED.PLUGGED 1 5367 
507 8902 282 LOW OUTPUT.READING OR VALUE 2 5040 
508 8902 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 1 5040 
509 8903 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 4 4997 
510 8903 525 PRESSURE INCORRECT 1 4997 
511 8904 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 1 4830 
512 8905 70 BROKEN.BURST.CUT.TORN 1 5406 
513 8905 190 CRACKED.CRAZED 1 5406 
514 8905 281 HIGH OUTPUT.READING OR VALUE 1 5406 
515 8905 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 4 5406 
516 8905 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 1 5406 
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517 8905 410 LACK OF LUBRICATION 5406 
518 8905 935 SCORED,SCRATCHED,BURNED,GOUGED 5406 
519 8906 37 FLUCTUATES.UNSTABLE FREQ RPM 5203 
520 8906 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 5203 
521 8906 922 OVERTEMP LIMITS EXCEEDED(EMS) 5203 
522 8907 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 4759 
523 8908            160 CONTACT/CONNECTION DEFECTIVE 5238 
524 8908 306 CONTAMINATION.NON METTALIC DIRTY 5238 
525 8908 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 5238 
526 8908 766 OUT OF SPEC 5238 
527 8908 922 OVERTEMP LIMITS EXCEEDED(EMS) 5238 
528 8909 70 BROKEN,BURST,CUT,TORN 4713 
529 8909 160 CONTACT/CONNECTION DEFECTIVE 4713 
530 8909 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 4713 
531 8909 525 PRESSURE INCORRECT 4713 
532 8910 127 ADJUSTMENT/ALIGNMENT IMPROPER 5518 
533 8910 180 CLOGGED.OBSTRUCTED,PLUGGED 5518 
534 8910 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 5518 
535 8911 766 OUT OF SPEC 4051 
536 8912 290 FAILS DIAGNOSTIC AUTOMATIC TEST 3789 
537 8912 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 3789 
538 8912 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 3789 
539 8912 922 OVERTEMP LIMITS EXCEEDED(EMS) 3789 
540 9001 69 FLAME OUT 4963 
541 9001 180 CLOGGED,OBSTRUCTED,PLUGGED 4963 
542 9002 20 WORN,STRIPPED,CHAFFED,FRAYED 4805 
543 9003 900 BURNED OR OVERHEATED 5751 
544 9004 127 ADJUSTMENT/ALIGNMENT IMPROPER 4689 
545 9004 398 OIL CONSUMPTION EXCESSIVE 4689 
546 9005 37 FLUCTUATES.UNSTABLE FREQ RPM 4908 
547 9005 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 4908 
548 9005 696 FLUID LOW 4908 
549 9006 37 FLUCTUATES.UNSTABLE FREQ RPM 4369 
550 9006 190 CRACKED.CRAZED 4369 
551 9006 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 3 4369 
552 9006 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 4369 
553 9006 803 NO DEFECT-REMOVED FOR TIME CHANGE 4369 
554 9007 37 FLUCTUATES.UNSTABLE FREQ RPM 4443 
555 9007 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 2 4443 
556 9008 37 FLUCTUATES.UNSTABLE FREQ RPM 5214 
557 9008 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 5214 
558 9008 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 2 5214 
559 9008 956 ABNORM FUNC OF COMPUTER MECH. EQUIP 5214 
560 9009 180 CLOGGED.OBSTRUCTED.PLUGGED 5051 
561 9009 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 5051 
562 9009 398 OIL CONSUMPTION EXCESSIVE 5051 
563 9010 690 VIBRATION EXCESSIVE 4675 
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5679011 
565      9011 
566 
567 
568 
569 
570 
571 
572 
573 
574 
575 
577 
578 
579 
580 
581 
582 
583 
584 
585 
586 
587 
588 
589 
590 
591 
592 
593 
594 
595 
596 
597 
598 
599 
600 
601 
602 
603 
604 
605 
606 
607 
608 
609 
610 
9011 
9101 
9101 
9101 
374 
615 
799 
282 
290 
374 
INTERNAL FAILURE 4171 
SHORTED 
NO DEFECT 
LOW OUTPUT.READING OR VALUE 
4171 
4171 
4822 
FAILS DIAGNOSTIC AUTOMATIC TEST 4822 
INTERNAL FAILURE 4822 
9101 525 
9102 170 
9102 374 
9102 381 
9103 
9103 
576!  9103 
9103 
9105 
9105 
9106 
9106 
9108 
9109 
9109 
9110 
9110 
9111 
9111 
9201 
9201 
9201 
9201 
9202 
9202 
9202 
9202 
9203 
9204 
9204 
9204 
9204 
9205 
9205 
9205 
9205 
9205 
9206 
9206 
9206 
9206 
37 
70 
190 
374 
37 
374 
20 
374 
374 
374 
410 
70 
306 
190 
374 
37 
135 
374 
690 
70 
190 
374 
381 
37 
185 
190 
334 
374 
306 
314 
374 
381 
525 
170 
290 
374 
381 
PRESSURE INCORRECT 4822 
CORRODED 4830 
INTERNAL FAILURE 4830 
LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 4830 
FLUCTUATES.UNSTABLE FREQ RPM 4343 
BROKEN,BURST,CUT,TORN 4343 
CRACKED.CRAZED 4343 
INTERNAL FAILURE 4343 
FLUCTUATES.UNSTABLE FREQ RPM 
INTERNAL FAILURE 
WORN.STRIPPED.CHAFFED.FRAYED 
4157 
4157 
4656 
INTERNAL FAILURE 4656 
INTERNAL FAILURE 5253 
INTERNAL FAILURE 4699 
LACK OF LUBRICATION 4699 
BROKEN,BURST,CUT,TORN 
CONTAMINATION.NON METTALIC DIRTY 
CRACKED.CRAZED 
4630 
4630 
3836 
INTERNAL FAILURE 3836 
FLUCTUATES.UNSTABLE FREQ RPM 3355 
BINDING STUCK OR JAMMED 3355 
INTERNAL FAILURE 3355 
VIBRATION EXCESSIVE 3355 
BROKEN,BURST.CUT.TORN 4188 
CRACKED.CRAZED 4188 
INTERNAL FAILURE 
LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 
4188 
4188 
FLUCTUATES.UNSTABLE FREQ RPM 4498 
CONTAMINATION 
CRACKED.CRAZED 
3874 
3874 
TEMPERATURE INCORRECT 3874 
INTERNAL FAILURE 3874 
CONTAMINATION.NON METTALIC DIRTY 3726 
ACCELERATION IMPROPER 3726 
INTERNAL FAILURE 3726 
LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 3726 
PRESSURE INCORRECT 3726 
CORRODED 4880 
FAILS DIAGNOSTIC AUTOMATIC TEST 4880 
INTERNAL FAILURE 
LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 
4880 
4880 
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611 9206 561 UNABLE TO ADJUST LIMITS 4880 
612 9207 306 CONTAMINATION,NON METTALIC DIRTY 3999 
613 9207 525 PRESSURE INCORRECT                                  _, 3999 
614 9208 L       20 WORN,STRIPPED,CHAFFED,FRAYED 4268 
615 9208 69 FLAME OUT 4268 
616 9208 180 CLOGGED.OBSTRUCTED.PLUGGED 4268 
617 9208 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 4268 
618 9209 190 CRACKED.CRAZED 13 4809 
619 9209 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 4809 
620 9210 170 CORRODED 4235 
621 9210 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 4235 
622 9210 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 2 4235 
623 9211 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 3911 
624 9212 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 3475 
625 9212 410 LACK OF LUBRICATION 3475 
626 9302 170 CORRODED 3573 
627 9302 281 HIGH OUTPUT.READING OR VALUE 3573 
628 9302 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 2 3573 
629 9303 70 BROKEN,BURST,CUT,TORN 4527 
630 9303 823 NO START 4527 
631 9304 37 FLUCTUATES,UNSTABLE FREQ RPM 3211 
632 9304 160 CONTACT/CONNECTION DEFECTIVE 3211 
633 9304 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 2 3211 
634 9305 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 3453 
635 9306 127 ADJUSTMENT/ALIGNMENT IMPROPER 3699 
636 9306 190 CRACKED.CRAZED 3699 
637 9306 290 FAILS DIAGNOSTIC AUTOMATIC TEST 3699 
638 9307 70 BROKEN,BURST,CUT,TORN 3243 
639 9307 282 LOW OUTPUT.READING OR VALUE 3243 
640 9308 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 3267 
641 9309 37 FLUCTUATES.UNSTABLE FREQ RPM 3903 
642 9309 170 CORRODED 3903 
643 9309 177 FUEL FLOW INCORRECT 3903 
644 9309 180 CLOGGED.OBSTRUCTED.PLUGGED 3903 
645 9309 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 3903 
646 9309 900 BURNED OR OVERHEATED 3903 
647 9311 170 CORRODED 3437 
648 9311 290 FAILS DIAGNOSTIC AUTOMATIC TEST 2 3437 
649 9311 314 ACCELERATION IMPROPER 3437 
650 9311 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 2 3437 
651 9311 823 NO START 3437 
652 9312 170 CORRODED 2640 
653 9312 465 UNDERSPEED 2640 
654 9401 334 TEMPERATURE INCORRECT 3189 
655 9401 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 3189 
656 9402 37 FLUCTUATES.UNSTABLE FREQ RPM 3591 
657 9402 180 CLOGGED.OBSTRUCTED.PLUGGED 3591 
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658 9402 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 3591 
659 9403 282 LOW OUTPUT.READING OR VALUE 4062 
660 9403 290 FAILS DIAGNOSTIC AUTOMATIC TEST 4062 
661 9404 37 FLUCTUATES,UNSTABLE FREQ RPM 2 3533 
662 9404 127 ADJUSTMENT/ALIGNMENT IMPROPER 3533 
663 9406 20 WORN,STRIPPED,CHAFFED,FRAYED 4009 
664 9406 282 LOW OUTPUT.READING OR VALUE 4009 
665 9406 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 4009 
666 9406 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 4009 
667 9406 900 BURNED OR OVERHEATED 4009 
668 9407 127 ADJUSTMENT/ALIGNMENT IMPROPER 2938 
669 9408 37 FLUCTUATES.UNSTABLE FREQ RPM 3303 
670 9409 185 CONTAMINATION 3573 
671 9410 70 BROKEN,BURST,CUT,TORN 2853 
672 9410 160 CONTACT/CONNECTION DEFECTIVE 2853 
673 9410 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 2853 
674 9411 37 FLUCTUATES.UNSTABLE FREQ RPM 3845 
675 9411 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 3845 
676 9411 525 PRESSURE INCORRECT 3845 
677 9412 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 3440 
678 9412 525 PRESSURE INCORRECT 2 3440 
679 9501 170 CORRODED 3582 
680 9501 374 INTERNAL FAILURE 3582 
681 9501 381 LEAKING-INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL 3582 
682 9502 525 PRESSURE INCORRECT 3171 
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APPENDIX B. NAVAL SAFETY CENTER REQUEST 
Due to the unclassified nature and unlimited distribution of this thesis, data obtained from the 
Naval Safety Center Safety Information Management System (SIMS) database is not included as a 
part of the thesis. This appendix contains an example of the request for query of the Aviation Safety 
database required to obtain information from the Naval Safety Center. If there is a need for the data, 
complete the request and fax or mail to the Naval Safety Center. 
(data) 
REQUEST FOR QUERY OF THE AVIATION SAFETY DATA BASE 
From:  (Unit/Billet or Code)__ 
To:    NAVSAFECEN Data Retrieval, Code ISA 
1.  A cruery of the Naval Safety Center Aviation Safety Data Base is 
requested for the following criteria: 
a. AIRCRAFT: _ 
b. TIME FRAME (yrmo)-:  to . (77 - date, online) 
c. SCOPE (mishaps/hazards; circle as appropriate): 
> ALFA BRAVO  CHARLIE  HAZARD BIRD   NMAC PHYS    EMBK 
STRIKE       EPISODE LDG 
FLIGHT      FLIGHT       GROUND 
RELATED 
d. SPECIFIC CRITERIA: 
This information will be used for the following (check/fill in 
as appropriate): 
( ) MISHAP INVESTIGATION: 
MISHAP  of 
(unit)  (sev/clas)       (serial)    (date) 
( ) HAZARD REPORT 
( ) SAFETY STAND DOWN on   
( ) GENERAL SAFETY TRAINING 
( ) Other (specify):  
(date) 
3. Point of Contact (print): 
Name/Rank: .  
Unit:    Billet/Code:   
DSN prefix:  COMM (area code)-exchange: (  
VOICE EXT:   FAX EXT:    DUTY OFF EXT: 
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REQUEST FOR QUERY OF THE AVIATION SAFETY DATA BASE page 2 
(Unit) (POO (date) 
Special Instructions: 
a. The PRIORITY of this request is (circle appropriate): 
IMMEDIATE TIME CRITICAL ROUTINE 
(Safety of Flight/        (3-6 weeks 
Mishap Investigation)    (NLT date)        for response) 
b. Delivery method requested (circle appropriate): 
■<        MAIL  FAX   PICK-UP  VOICE/PHONE OTHER:  
c. SNDL Unit mailing address (required; retrieval cannot be made 
without correct mailing address): 
d. Other instructions: 
5. Disclaimer: Requestor acknowledges and agrees that the information 
provided from this request is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY and will be used only 
for safety in the purpose stated in paragraph 2. Deviation of use or 
release of information beyond the specified scope requires express written 
authorization form the Commander, Naval Safety Center. Requestor further 
acknowledges that portions of the information supplied may be "privileged 
information" as defined in OPNAVINST 3750.6 (series) the unauthorized 
release or use thereof is a violation punishable under the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice. 
Signed: 
(name/rank/service) 
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APPENDIX C. AIRCREW SURVEY 
This appendix contains a copy of the complete aircrew survey as well as the results of the 
survey in spreadsheet format. 
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S-3 / ES-3 AIRCREW SURVEY 
The following survey is being conducted to aid  in a research effort 
investigating single-engine rate-of-climb capabilities and requirements for the S-3 
and ES-3 aircraft. Input is being solicited from Pilots and NFO's currently assigned 
to VS / VQ Squadrons on both the east and west coasts. Your assistance in 
completing this survey will help provide valuable input to Navy decision-makers 
and contribute to improved safety-of-flight and mission performance for the ST3 and 
ES-3 aircraft in the years ahead. 
This survey should take approximately 10 MINUTES to complete. Please 
answer all questions to the best of your ability. Answer by circling your response 
where there is a multiple choice question. If there is a blank space provided 
following a question state your own opinion or preference, there is no right or wrong 
answer. If a question does not apply to you please write N/A next to that question 
number and proceed to the next question. 
There is space provided following the last question for any additional 
comments or questions that you might have. All responses will be kept anonymous 
and confidential so there is no need for your name, rank, or other personal data 
other than what is asked for. 
Thank you for your attention and assistance in completing this survey. 
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I. BACKGROUND INFORMATION (Circle your responses) 
1. Designator A. PILOT        B   NFO 
2. Community A. VS B. VQ 
3. Total Flight Time (hrs)    A. 0-499    B.  500-999    C. 1000-1499     D. 1500-1999    E. 2000+ 
4. S-3 Flight Time (hrs)       A. 0-499    B. 500-999    C. 1000-1499     D. 1500-1999    E. 2000+ 
5. ES-3 Flight Time (hrs)     A. 0-499    B. 500-999    C. 1000-1499     D. 1500-1999    E. 2000+ 
[I.        THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS INVOLVE SINGLE-ENGINE FLIGHT IN THE S-3/ES-3 
1. Have you ever experienced take-off conditions in which you would not have a calculated positive 
single-engine rate-of-climb with the landing gear retracted? 
A. YES B. NO 
2. If you answered YES to the previous question, which of the following factors do you feel had 
the most significant impact on your single-engine rate-of-climb? (circle one that most applies) 
A. Temperature B. Field Elevation      C. External Stores     D. Insufficient Thrust 
3. Have you experienced an actual single-engine emergency situation? If yes, how many times? 
A. YES 12        3      4+ B. NO 
4. If you answered YES to the previous question, during what phase of flight did the single-engine 
condition occur? (if multiple events circle all that apply) 
A. Takeoff    B. Climbout     C. Cruise/Mission    D. Approach    E. Landing 
5. Have you ever experienced an engine related malfunction, that did not require shutting down the 
engine, during or immediately after takeoff? If yes, how many times? 
A. YES 12        3      4+ B. NO 
6   Have you ever been required to jettison external stores in an effort to achieve an increased rate- 
of-climb? If yes, how many times? 
A.  YES 12        3      4+ B. NO 
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m.      THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS PERTAIN TO THE PERFORMANCE OF THE TF-34 
ENGINE AS PRESENTLY CONFIGURED ON THE S-3/ES-3. 
1. Do you feel that the TF-34 engines provide sufficient thrust for the mission of the S-3? 
A.  YES B. NO 
2. If you answered NO to the previous question, during what mission/flight phase is additional 
thrust required? 
A. Takeoff   B. Climbout    C. Cruise/Mission   D. Approach   E. Landing   F.  
3. Do you feel that the TF-34 engines provide sufficient thrust for the mission of the ES-3? 
A. YES B.NO "        • 
4. If you answered NO to the previous question, during what mission/flight phase is additional 
thrust required? 
A. Takeoff   B. Climbout    C. Cruise/Mission    D. Approach    E. Landing    F.  
5. What precautions must be taken if the engine T5 control system malfunctions or is disabled? 
6. Will the disabling of the engine T5 control system provide any advantage in engine performance? 
A. YES B. NO C. Don't know 
7. If you answered YES to the previous question, what performance advantage do you perceive? 
88 
8.  Several methods of increasing single-engine climb performance for the S-3/ES-3 are being 
evaluated. Which of the following methods would you recommend? 
A. No changes required, performance is satisfactory 
B. An Automatic Power Reserve (APR) system which would provide increased thrust from 
the operating engine in the event of a single-engine failure. 
C. Decrease aircraft gross weight by utilizing new technologies to decrease internal 
component and systems weight. 
D. New engines with increased thrust. 
E. OTHER IDEAS?  
9. Why would you prefer the method selected in the previous question? 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR ASSISTANCE IN COMPLETING THIS SURVEY. PLEASE FEEL 
FREE TO ADD ANY ADDITIONAL COMMENTS OR QUESTIONS RELATING TO THIS SURVEY 
OR ANY ASPECT OF TF-34 ENGINE PERFORMANCE, RELIABILITY, OR MAINTAINABILITY. 
IF YOU HAVE A QUESTION THAT YOU WOULD LIKE ANSWERED DIRECTLY, PLEASE 
LEAVE YOUR NAME AND AUTO VON NUMBER AS A POINT OF CONTACT. THANK YOU. 
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APPENDIX D. SIMULATOR DATA 
This appendix contains the complete listing in spreadsheet format of all data collected utilizing 
the OFT and associated thrust model for measurement of SEROC and thrust performance 
parameters. 
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EFFECTS OF T-5 ON RAY E-OF-CLIM 1 
1 S-3 ES-3 S-3 
IbMH 
60 
ALI 
SL 
WT 
40000 
T/O SPD 
115 A DOWN 510 460 600 1000 66.67% 
675 1100 62.96% 
600 1125 87,50% 
625 1075 72.00% 
60 SL 44000 121 A DOWN 330 280 400 900 125.00% 
420 850 102.38% 
1 390 900 130.77% 
1 403 883 119.01% 
—        I 
80 SL 44000 121 A DOWN 190 80 200 600 200.00% 
225 625 177.78% 
2QQ 600 200.00% 
208 608 192.00% 
100 SL 44000 121 A DOWN 60 -120 75 500 566.67% 
125 500 300.00% 
100 450 350.00% 
100 483 383.33% 
ALTITUDE i WD TEMPEI JATURE EFF =CTS ON TF J4 ENGINE 'ERFORMAI ICE PARAMI ETERS I 1 
I SEA LEVEL 4,000 ft 
MRT w/T5 MRT no T5 % increase MRT w/T5 MRT no T5 % increas 6 
Temp=60 
Fuel Flow 3000 3900 2700 3500 
NG 97 101 97 101 
ITT _^ 810 930 810 930 
NF 6400 7200 6500 7300 
Thrust 8599 .... .... 7804 9603 23.05% 
Temp=80 
Fuel Flow 2800 3500 2500 3200 
NG 97 102 97 101 
ITT 810 930 810 930 
NF 6300 7000 6400 7100 
Thrust 7950 9717 22.23% 7237 8899 22.97% 
Temp=100 
Fuel Flow 2600 3300 2300 2900 
NG 97 102 97 101 
ITT 810 930 810 930 
NF 6200 6800 6250 6950 
Thrust 7270 8977 23.48% 6625 8232 24.26% 
**** Thrust oi tputwasgrea ter than max imum display value of 10,0 )0 
92 
WIND AND TEI\ 1PERATURE EF FECTS ON TF3 4 ENGINE THR JST 
OFT-2 
TEMP WIND with T-5 w/o T-5 "/»increase wind effect wind w/o T-5 
60 0 8634 **** **** 
60 20 8314 *+** **** 96.29% 
60 30 8187 **** **** 98.47% 
60 40 8060 9895 22.77 98.45% 
60 50 7933 9764 23.08 98.42% 98.68% 
60 60 7805 9633 23.42 98.39% 98.66% 
80 0 7814 9631 23.25 
80 15 7635 9448 23.75 97.71% 98.10% 
80 30 7451 9259 24.27 97.59% 98.00% 
100 0 7107 8894 25.14 
100 15 6933 8717 25.73 97.55% 98.01% 
100 30 6753 8533 26.36 97.40% 97.89% 
OFT-5 
TEMP WIND with T-5 w/o T-5 %increase wind effect wind w/o T-5 
60 0 8589 **** **** 
60 20 8398 **** **** 97.78% 
60 30 8206 **** **** 97.71% 
60 40 8079 9962 23.31 98.45% 
60 50 7951 9831 23.64 98.42% 98.69% 
60 60 7824 9699 23.96 98.40% 98.66% 
80 0 7841 9706 23.79 
80 15 7665 9515 24.14 97.76% 98.03% 
80 30 7469 9324 24.84 97.44% 97.99% 
100 0 7132 8967 25.73 
100 15 6951 8782 26.34 97.46% 97.94% 
100 30 6770 8596 26.97 97.40% 97.88% 
**** Thru; t output was gre ater than maxim im display value of 10,000 
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APPENDIX E. FAN SPEED DROOP DATA 
This appendix contains the complete listing in spreadsheet format of all data collected utilizing 
the operational engine fan speed performance check as well as the OFT thrust model measurement 
of the effects of fan speed droop. 
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EFFECTS OF NF DROOP ON ENGINE THRUST 
TEMP WINDS NFffiMRT THRUST -100 NF  %chq -200 NF  %cha -300 NF  %cha -400 NF   %chq 
60 0 6750 8633 8294 96.07% 8040 93.13% 7768 89.98% 7462 86.44% 
60 15 6750 8442 8105 96.01% 7848 92.96% 7579 89.78% 7226 85.60% 
60 30 6750 8252 7920 95.98% 7678 93.04% 7262 88.00% 7051 85.45% 
80 0 6650 7992 7697 96.31% 7412 92.74% 7111 88.98% 6779 84.82% 
80 15 6650 7805 7466 95.66% 7165 91.80% 6967 89.26% 6632 84.97% 
80 30 6650 7620 7284 95.59% 6988 91.71% 6735 88.39% 6461 84.79% 
100 0 6550 7320 7038 96.15% 6809 93.02% 6511 88.95% 6220 84.97% 
100 15 6550 7138 6855 96.04% 6626 92.83% 6363 89.14% 6012 84.23% 
100 30 6550 6958 6640 95.43% 6416 92.21% 6163 88.57% 5884 84.56% 
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